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PREFAOE 
Relations between the United states and Germany dur-
ing the past fifty years have had the unique oharaoteristio of 
being violently disrupted by two gigantio world oonflictsr In 
each struggle Amerioans have opposed Germans both ideological-
ly and militarily. As a result, so muoh attention has been 
paid to these times of strife that the peaoeful era of the 
1920's has come to be regarded by many as of only secondary tm-
portanoe. 
Historioally speaking, this may be true. Yet this 
does not mean that American intercourse with the Reich during 
the period of the Weimar Republio should be ignored or forgot- . 
ten. The years that lay between the demise of 'Kaiser Billa 
and the rise of Adolf Hitler were pregnant not only with numer-
\ 
ous manifestations of real progress toward a German-American 
rapprochement, but were also filled with many indications of 
better times to oome. A study of the Weimar era, then, present, 
an interesting oontrast to the unhappy state of affairs in 
which the German and American nations found themselves in the 
years that both preceded and followed this period. 
Finally, if for no other reason than to unoover the 
ili 
iv 
-factors whioh made possible suoh a relationship between the 
• 
.. 
Reioh and America, the subjeot of this thesis has had, indeed, 
a sufficient warrant for ita undertaking. Oompleted, it leaves 
.--
many questions yet to be answered, but at the same time, it 
approaohes at least one step oloser to a fuller understanding 
of the problem at hand. 
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OHAPTER I 
GERMAN-AMERIO~-BELATIONS PRIOR TO 1919 
American relations with the Weimar Republic, while 
they are the primary object of this investigation, are in them-
l 
selves but a small fragment of that greater assooiation whioh 
has concerned the United states and Germany during the past 
three oenturies. Oonsequently, in order to place the events 
of the early post-World War era in their proper setting, and 
thereby to faci11tate an understanding of their role in the 
whole of German-American relations, some br1ef account of the 
background leading up to this per10d 1s necessary. 
At the outset, it might be well to point out that, 
prior to the First World War, affairs between Germany and Amer-
ica fell sharply into two well defined phases. For slightly 
\ 
over a century beginning with the American Revolution, a grow-
ing friendship slowly manifested itself between the two na-
tions, but when oommercial and colon1al rivalries emerged upon 
the scene in the late 1800's an antagonistio attitude developed 
which culminated in the chaos of 1917 and 1918. This d!vision 
might well be kept in mind as the following events are related. 
1 
I. 
a 
During the seventeenth oentury. due to the undevel-
oped nature of both oountries. little intercGUfse of any sort 
was oarried on between them. William Penn's exhortation for 
. 
Germans to oome to America was probably the only real con-
tact made between the two peoples before the Revolution. Some 
years later, the alliance between the British and Frederick 
• the Great of Prussia was instrumental in practioally eliminat-
ing the Frenoh from the Western Hemisphere, a faotor of great 
importanoe in the development of the thirteen American colonies 
Events in the· 1750's, however, turned the Prussian king against 
his ally in such a way that his antagonism to Britain proved to 
be a boon to the struggling oolonists after 1775. 
American friendship with Prussia;and its ruler never 
a8sumed the oharacter of a full-fledged alliance, however. l 
Though he weloomed any English misfortune, espeoially of a oom-
mercial nature, Frederiok doubted the ability of the Ame~ican 
• 
rabble to deteat the oraok British militia, and since he him-
self wished to avoid a tangle with the red-coats, he adamantly 
clung to his polioy of remaining a "tranquil spectator. p2 
Many more times than one did he hold himself aloof from the col 
1 Paul Leland Haworth, "Frederiok the Great and the 
~~er1can Revolution," American Historical Review~ New York, The 
Macmillan Co., IX, 1904~ passim. 
2 Ibid., 463. 
I 
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3 
onial agents, ~eane, Franklin, and Lee, at one time even dub-
bing them as lin too muoh of a hurry with thelr propositions 
for a formal [oommeroial] negot;iation. n3 He did,' ,however, re-
. 
fuse passage through his dOmains to British meroenaries from 
Hesse,4 and in 1777, sent Baron Frederick William von Steuben 
to improve the conditi,on of the ragged Amerioan army. The 
Prussian general trained the colonial units so well that 
in the military history of our Revolution, 
if we olass men aocording to their services, 
no one after Washington and [General Nathan-
ael] Greene stands so bigh as Steuben.5 
Several other slight ooncessions were accorded to 
the colonies in the remaining years of the American Revolution? 
but not until England herself had conceded the pOint, did the , 
Prussian government recognize the independenoe of the United 
States. This done, the way was thrown open for the establis~ 
ment of formal oommeroial ties, and thus, within a few years 
three treaties, 7 widely aoclaimed as new standards of int'er-
\ 
3 Ibid., 464. Frederiok to Schulenburg, May 6, 1777. 
4 Ibid., 462. Quotes Frederiok's Works, IV, 178. 
5 George Washington Greene, The German Element in 
the War of American Independenoe, New York, H~·a and Houghton, 
llf7'6:B"S:-
6 Haworth, 470-472. 
7 Texts are given in James B. Soott, The Treaties of 
'1785, 1799, and 1828 between the United States a~russ1n, --
- - ~ - ........ ---~-New York, Oxford University Press, 1918, passim. 
I 
4 
national condu~t, were oonoluded between the two governments. 
Benjamin Franklin,rwho negotiated the first o~ these pacts in 
~785, so projected his humanitarian outlook that such novel pr 
. 
visions were included as (.1) the abolition of privateers in cas 
of war between the signatories, (2) the purchase, not the con-
fisoation, of oontraband, (3:) the allowance of nine months for 
l the retirement of enemy aliens in case of oonflict between the 
adherents, and (4) the oonvoying of eaoh other's ships during a 
war in whioh both parties were neutral. 
This treaty, whioh further provided for the oondition 
al granting of oommeroial favors to Prussia,8 was renewed in 
modified form in 1799 and 1828.9 Beoause of the small volume 0 
trade in the early period of German-Amerioan relations, amity 
and equality prevailed, although in later years, due to the dif 
ferent interpretations given these olauses'by Germany and the 
United States, many internat10nal disputes oame to the fore. 10 
, 
The f1rst half of the nineteenth oentury was a per10d , 
8 George M. Fisk, 'German-Amerioan 'Most-Favored-Na-
tion' Relations,· Journal of Politioal Eoonoml, Chicago, Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, XI, 1903, a20. 
9 The negotiations regarding these treaties are cov-
ered in Count Otto zu Stolberg-Wernigerode, Germanl and ~ Uni~­
ed States of America durin~ the Era of Bismarok, Heading, Pa., 
Henry Janssen Foundation, 1937, 11-1'2; Jesse S. Reeves, liThe 
Prusaian-knerican Treaties,n American Journal of International 
~, New York, Oxford University Press, XI, 1917, 497-501. -
10 Wallace McOlure, "German-.American Conunercial Rela- I 
tions," American Journal .2!. International ~, XIX, 1925, 692. I 
5 
of expanding Amerioan interoourse, not only with Prussia, but 
also with the Hansa towns of Bremen and Hamburg, the Zollverein, 
.. 
and other states independent of the toll union. Trade with the 
Hansa oities existed long-before 1800, but due to Napoleon's 
oontinental b10okade, Amerioan ships were seen on the Elbe for 
the last time before Waterloo in 1808. After 1815, oommeroe 
again so flourished that New York and Philadelphia beoame the 
seats of oonsulate-genera1 offioes representing Hamburg and Br 
men. l1 Between 1820 and 1827 the volume of German goods coming 
into the United States was valued at fourteen million two hun-
dred fifty thousand dollars, and return produots to Europe 
reaohed the sum of eighteen million dollars.12 By 1840, how- , 
ever, due to an eConomic depression and the pre-eminence of in-
ternal trade in Amerioa, exports to harbors on the Elbe and Wes 
er dropped oonsiderably,13 tobaooo importations, notably by Bre 
men, alone oontinuing to be high. A Zollverein paot in wh1ch 
\ 
the United States agreed to levy no more than twenty per oent 0 
agriculture and industrial produots of the member states in ex-f 
change for lowered rates on lard and tobacoo in Germany, was ne 
got1ated in 1844, although this was but one of many such treat-
11 Stolberg, 20. 
12 Ibid., 21. 
13 Ib1d. Statistioal data given. Oites W!tjen, Aus 
der Fruhzeit des Nordatlantik Verkebrs, 13. 
i 
I 
I 
s 
made with the several German states during this period. 14 
The revolutionary movements in oentral Europe in 1848 
.. 
and 1849 opened a new channel for German-American relations • 
. 
For the first time in th~1r history, the American p,eople as a 
whole took an aotive interest in what was going on in German~l 
for they saw there a struggle muoh the same as the one they had 
undertaken some seventy years earlier. Interest was high. be-
cause the promised changes seemed to parallel American demoora-
oy, because innumerable German-Amerioan voters could not be ig-
nored by aspirants to political office, and finally, as GazleYS 
puts it, because the German government "might fill the pocket-
books of Amerioan citizens" through favorable oommeroial ties. 
Sharp criticism, however, soon.voioed itself when the expected 
. 
did not happen, so that many Amerioana took the attitude that 
the Germans were unfit for liberal institutionsl ? or that they 
, 
14 Ibid. Oites Fisk, Die Handelspolitischen und 80n-
stigen volkerrecntlichen Bezeihungen, 89ff;and Webster, {rat-
ings and Speeches, XII, 8bff. See also: Samuel F. Bemis e.)" 
American Secretaries of State and their Diplomaoy, New York, A. 
Knopf, i9!3lJ, V, 2:34-2'27. -
15 R.C. MoGrane, "The American Position on the Revo-
lution of 1848 in Germany,- Historioal Outlook, Philadelphia, 
McKinley Publishing Co., XI, 1920, ~~3. 
16 John G. Gazley, American Opinion of German Unifi-
cation: ~-l871, New York, Columbia ~niversity-press, 1926, 
32-3~. 
17 ~. 
I 
I 
I 
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7 
laoked "patien.oe,stability of purpose, and determinatiolll 1n 
aooomp11shment of their endS. ala 
On the international soene, PruS,s1a was more favored 
, --. than Austr1a, although Freder10k W1111am IV was muoh d1s11ked 
beoause of h1s adherenoeto the od1ous Holy Al11ance.19 The 
Frankfort Assembly, above all, was popularly or1t1c1zed both 
• 
for 1ts self1shness and impraot1oab1l1ty, and by John O. Oal-
houn for 1ts over-oentralization.20 Oalhoun favored a cont1nu-
ation of the,ex1st1ng feder~t10n, though w1th added powers over 
fore1gn affa1rs, defense, and enforoement of 1nternal co-opera-
tion. At the same time, however, he felt that the sucoess of 
, const1 tut1ona11smJn all Europe depended on. that of the German, 
revolut1on, for he sa1d: "If she [Germany] fa11s, the others 
probably will.,21 
Off101al German-Amer1oan relations at the oonclus10n 
of the revolut1onary per10d underWent a rather strange trans-
formation, primar1ly because of the change of adm1n1strations 
from James Polk to Zachary Tayior in 1849. During his oountry't' 
t 
1849. 
18 Ib1d. Quotes Massaohusetts guarterly Review, Marc\, 
19 Ib1d., 36. 
20 ~., 45-46. 
21 Merle E. Curt1, 'John O. Calhoun and the Unifica-
tion of Germany," 'Amerioan Historical Review, XL, 1935, 476-478~ 
I 
I 
, ______________________________ ~-------------I, 
8 
. struggle with Denmark at that time, Baron ~on R~enne, the Ger-
,man ambassador to lashington, sought aid from :~e United States 
'government, the latter of which oonsented to Prussia's use of 
Amerioan naval laws, gun ~..aft·s, do ok plans, and taotical in-
formation. President Polk approved even the manning and pro-
visioning of an Amerioan frigate for dispatoh to Bremen, a pro-
oess which was readily our tailed when Taylor took offioe. ~ol­
lowing an offioial Danish protest, the Justioe Department de-
manded of von Roenne that he submit a bond of 'peaceful intent" 
for the ship. The ambassador rather reluotantly oomplied, and 
the vessel was finally able to olear the port of New York on 
May 24, 1849, although an aooident prevented it from ever being 
used in servioe against the Danes. Taylor's policy.of non~ln­
tervention was widely aoolaimed by the Amerioan people, who, 
t~ougb sympathetio to the German oause, were quite averse to 
violating the1r traditional manner of keep1ng aloof from the 
affairs of Europe. 22 , 
During the period of the Oivil War in the \Jni ted State, , 
Amerioan relations with Germany were oarried on mainly through 
the media of d1plomaoy and f1nanoe, although the war itself had 
its effects upon trade and publio op1n10n in Prussia and her SiT' 
ter states. Both the Un10n and Confederacy had envoys in Prus-
22 McGrane, 334-339. 
'~'--""""--.-,,-., - ... --.. " .. ----.~- ...... ---.---~~ .... -"."""""" ... ~~." .. --.--. "'+', .. 
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, 
sia, while the latt,er' and several other German provinces were 
also represented in Amerioa. The Prussian ambassador was Frei-
.. 
herr von Gerolt, a pro-Unionist who knew the Amerioan soene 
well. From Bremen oame Rudolf Sohleiden, a keen man of commerc 
who even offered himself in 18S1 as mediator for 
proohement between the warring faotions, but who was unsucoess-
ful in his mission. 23 
Publio opinion in Prussia was divided, although the 
greater number of oitizens~were Union sympathizers.24 Yet, as 
Carl Sohurz reported, the Oonfederaoy had many supporters among 
the army caste. ~hO "hated democraoy and wished that the RepUbl1t 
of the United States, as the greatest and most attraot1ve ex-
ample of demooraoy, should fall. "25 Nevertheless, despite this 
. 
diVision, the Amerioan legation was so flooded in mid-1SSl with 
applioations from German enlistees that a notioe had to be post 
ed stating that the building was "not a reoruiting office!"26 
, 
23 Stolberg, 47; Ralph H. Lutz, 'Rudolf Sohleiden and 
the Visit to Riohmond,' Amerioan Historioal Assooiation Annual 
Report, Washington, D.C., 1915, 207-a16. 
24 That is, among those of any opinion at all. 
25 Stolberg, 50-51. 
2S Ibid. Numbers of aotual German personnel who 
fought in Nortnern and Southern ranks are given on pg. 54. Clte 
Kaufmann, Q!! Deutsohen ~ amerikanischen BUrgerkriege, 131. 
i 
I 
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10 
The ~ress, represented by books, newspapers, and per-
iodicals, reflected the same divided outloOk.~7 Offioial oir-
oles, on the other band, leaned more to a neutral pos1tion. For 
example, Count Otto von Bl~marok, ohanoellor after 1862, was un-
oonvinoed by his sohool friend, John Lathrop Motley, that right 
was wholly with the North, and thus often spoke of the "h1ghly 
oultured men of the South. 128 Too, as a believer in the 1n-
i 
equa11ty of ind1viduals and races, he opposed the total emano1p 
tion of slaves. 
Strangely enough, the war touohed Germany both econ-
omioally and finanoially. Though their ootton imports were muc 
lower than those of either Franoe or Great Britain, both Prussi 
and Bavaria suffered ill effeots from the shortage 'of this ran 
material.29 In fact, due to the seriousness of the situation, 
steps were early taken for the proteotion of German trade, par-
ticularly through the Union's announoement that it would adhere 
to the Deolarat1on of Paris of 1856 which abolished the prao-
tioe of privateering.30 
27 Ibid., 51-52. 
-
28 Ibid., 63. Mitohell Xing, a fraternity brother 0 
Bismarck, was from the South. 
29 Ibid., 49-50. Cites Bismarok, Gesammelte Werke, 
X, 149, and OloawIg-Hohenlohe, DenkwUrdigkeiten, I, 147. 
30 Bemis, Seoretaries of state, VI, 145-294, 420-
431; Stolberg, 48-49. 
" -.-~ - -,- -- - . ..........-. _ ... -- ---"--"'~~.........,-....... -~ .. ~.-. ....,-... ~-", ... ~"""~ '-. 
11 
'More w1despread, however, were the f1nano1al aspects 
of the war, espeo1ally B~noe both bel11gerents approaohed the 
.. 
'German states for monetary loans. Efforts of Robert J. Walker 
for the Union and Baron RapHael Erlanger for the Southern Con-
.. -
federaoy oulminated in the solioitation of huge sums of needed 
funds. 31 The Confederates enjoyed early suooesses, but later 
fruits went to the Northerners, primarily beoause the R1c~ond 
government was not reoognized in Prussia. 32 As time went by, 
even the direct purohase of arms beoame d1ffioult for the South 
erners, and their attempt to disoredit Northern seourities met 
with dismal fa11ure. 
The year~ between 1866 and 1871 Witnessed the tremen-
dous efforts of Count Bismarck to unify the polyglot German 
states into one empire. The resulting wars with Austria and 
with France oaused a flurry of Amerioan interest both in favor 
or and against the German aotions. In the first conflict Prus-
sia was generally regarded as the aggressor,33 although muoh 
contempt was also heaped upon Catholio Austria by the champions 
of Protestantism in the United States. Suoh oomments as that 
31 Stolberg, 57-58. Quotes Walker as reminding the 
Amerioan people in 1867 that Germans aocepted $250,000,000 wort 
of U.S,. bonds. Corroberates statement by oiting Ellis J. Obel'-
holtzer, Jay Gould, I, 513, who puts the figure at $200,000,000. 
32 Ibid., 60. Cites Dept. of State, DisEatches, Prus-
~, II, No. l~ 
33 Qazley, 178. 
, 
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I whioh was expressed by the Portland TranscriRt were not unoom-I mon:" 
.. 
The migh~ of Protestantism and the free ten-
dencies of Germany have triumphed over the 
foroes of despotism and religious intoleranoe.34 
.--
Finally, when the North German Oonfederation was formed, many 
Amerioans, looking back to 1848, found reason to rejoice, but 
at the same time there were those who looked somewhat ask~oe 
at the establishment of a powerful Prussian despotlsm whioh 
might easily spread elsewhere. 36 
More direct relations between the Amerioan and German 
peoples took plaoe during the Franco-Prussian struggle whlch 
commenced in July, 1870. A mutual amity was exemplified in the 
servioes of Mr. Elihu B. Washburne, American ambassador to Par-
~ 
is, who kindly consented to manage affairs at the Prussian leg-
ation for the duration of hostilities. During this time, some 
thirty thousand individuals of German birth were provided with 
the means to flee from Frenoh violenoe, and more than twenty 
\ 
thousand others were supported with one and two dollar doles fo \ 
months at a time.~6 Washburne was publioly honored in Berlln 
for his servioes shortly after the war's end. 
34 
ust 18, 1866. 
Ibid., 204-205. 
-
35 ~., 231. 
Quotes Portland Transoript, Aug-
36 Adolf Hepner, America's Aid to Germany in 1870-
~, st. Louis, MO., no publlsher glven;I905, passii7 
i 
I 
I 
I 
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13 
I The American attitude toward the,confllot in its in-
I'itial stages is neatly summed up by GazleYI w;o'says: "Most 
! Northerners, most Westerners, -most Protestants, most Republic-
ans, most American patriots sympathized with the Prussian 
oause. n37 Antagonism toward French maohinations in Uexico,~8 
the greater ratio of German over Frenoh immigrants in this ooun 
try, and the ever-present religious faotor39 were oombined·to 
create this opinion. After Sedan l however l a oonsiderable shif 
. 
took plaoe in Amerioan thought,40 and there was an intense 
for materials to suooor the gallant French, orushed as they wer 
by 
~he most relentless and malignant of oon-
querors that the Old World had seen since 
Att1la and h1s Huns earned the t1tle of 
the soourge of God.41 
Hosti11t1es oeased in the spr1ng of 1871, and conse-
quently these attitudes were soon diss1pated. Nevertheless, 
with the founding of _the Empire at Versailles a new era of Ger-
man-Amer10an relations began to unfold 1tself. The day of par- , 
37 
38 
ust 31, 1870. 
Gazley, 322. 
1Jlli!., 327. Quotes San Franoisoo Bulletin, Aug-
39 Scribner's Magazine, Deoember, 1870, exemplified 
this factor when it said: ilClose upon the heels of the Papal fa1~,-: Ecr [infallibility] was the attaok of France upon Prussia; of P2 f -
pa France, be it noted, upon Protestant Prussia. 1I GazIey, 354. 
40 Gazley, 380-381. 
41 Ibid., 398. Quotes New York Times, Sept. 28, 1810. 
14 
oohialiam soon disappeared and with it vanished the spirit of 
amity and oo-operation whioh had oolored the interoourse of the 
. ~ 
two na tiona for over a oentury. - Of oourse, the ohange oould 
hardly be noticed in those early years, but yet the seed of 
the First World War were slowly being sown in the petty, then 
more serious oommeroial confliots that speokled the eighties, 
the nineties, and the first one and one-half deoades of the • 
twentieth oentury. 
The first real symptom of this growing transformation 
came in 1879 when Bismarok induoed the German parliament to 
abandon its polioy of low tariff and to adopt a new system of 
high duties and pronounced proteotlon.42 The ohancellor then 
initiated a plan whereby he gained privileges by giv~ng them, 
thereby building up a tremendous industrial output whioh in 
turn refleoted itself in a great and expanding commerce. 
As a result of this growth, Germany was put in a bet-
\ 
ter position to trade with the United States, and thus began to 
import Amerioan food and raw materials in large quantities. How 
ever, the Reioh soon found that it was underbid on cheap man-
ufactured produots, with the oonsequence that an era of aoute 
industrial rivalry oame into being.43 In 1883 the Germans beg 
42 Oharles Downer Hazen, Modern Europe, New York, 
Henry Holt and Company, 1926, 477. 
43 Stolberg, xviii. 
, 
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15 
restriotions on Am~r1oan agrioultural produot8,44 a practice 
which soon brought retaliat10n from the United States in form 
.. 
of an aot requiring a variable tonnage duty on ships based upon 
. 
their distanoe from home ports.45 The matter came to nothing, 
however, probably beoause Bismarck aocorded little signifioance 
to American affairs in his diplomatic oaloulations. 46 His 
l 
shortsightedness, nevertheless, was to have disastrous reper-
oussions in the future. 
Oommerc1al rivalry between Amer10a and Germany mount-
ed in 1890 to a point where d1plomaoy was needed to av01d more 
aorimonious developments. The McKinley Tar1ff Act of that year 
not only raised import duties to a peak theretofore unknown,47 
b.ut also gave the Pr~sident the power to make dutlab~e any item 
on the free list ooming from oountries deemed discriminating 
against Amerioan products. This act so thoroughly frightened 
the Germans who were rest rioting certain meats imported from 
this country, that a conference, known as the Saratoga Conven-
tion, was arranged for settlement of this problem in 1891. A 
44 MoOlure, 694-695. 
45 ~.; John Bassett Moore, A Digest of Intern~­
tional ~, Washington, D.C., U.8. Qov't. Printing Off., 1906, ~88. 
46 E. Maloomb Oarroll, Germany and the Great Powers: 
~-l9l4, New York, Prentice-Hall, Ino., 19t8;-4l0. 
47 McClure, 694-695. 
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promise not to use the duty-f1x1ng power was thus exohanged for 
cancellation of the 'disoriminatory regulations employed by the 
... 
Reich. 48 
Another aspeot of_the antagonistio German-Amerioan 
commeroial pioture between 1880 and 1910 was oonoerned with the 
most-favored-nat1on policies followed by the two nations. In 
America, as far baok as 1778,49 treaties of this sort were oon-
sidered conditionally, that is, favors were acoorded only to 
those nations which tendered equivalent oompensation. The Ger-
mans, on the other band, followed a polioy of rendering treat-
ment equal to the best aooorded to any other country, and this 
uncondi tionally. Above all, as the Germans gave, so they also 
sought to reoeive. 50 
As a result, ·with no other country did the American 
interpretation of the most-favored-nation olause give rise to 
so many or suoh persistent disputes as with Germany.n5l On one 
oooasion, in 1884, the Germans protested a trade oonoession giv , 
en to Switzerland whioh was not similarly aooorded to them, but 
their claims were resolutely ignOred. 52 Again, in 1902, a simi 
48 Ibid.; Oarroll, 410. 
49 McClure, 689-701. 
50 ~. 
51 Fisk, "Most-Favored-Nation Relations," 220-236. 
52 MoOlure J 696-697. 
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1ar request was, made for oertain "oonoessions" suoh as were en-
joyed by Cuba, but .Amerioan offioials refused,~la~ing that 
the Cubans deserved "special ~elattonsn due to their prox1mity 
to the United States.53 Affairs were partially smoothed over 
through tariff revisions by both nations during 1909 and 1910, 
although pr10r to 1922 the basic problem of oonflioting inter-
• pretations of most-favored-nation polioies were never oomplete-
ly solved. 54 
A seoond and probably greater souroe of international 
friotion after 1871 developed in the oolonial field. True 
enough, Bismarok seemingly55 opposed overseas expansion in the 
early years of the infant Empire, but his own polioy of pro-
teotion, formulated in 1879, plus the implantation of individu-
al German firms in wo~ld trade oenters oaused the chanoellor to 
ohange his mind by 1884, when he adopted a vigorous program of 
oolonization for the Reioh. 56 
Destined to olash in both the Paoifio and the Carib- , 
bean, Amerioa and Germany first found themselves at oolonial 
cross-purposes in Samoa, an island group strategically located 
53 Ibid.~ 696n. 
54 Ib1d., 696. 
55 Mary E. Townsend, The B!!! and Fall of Germany's 
Colon1al Emuire: 1884-1918, New York, Maomill~o., 1930, 
Chapte'rUtII. 
56 Hazen, 468. 
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on the trade ~oute. to Australia, Ohina~ Oalifornia, and even 
Europe in the event of a canal being built at Panama. In 1854 
the Hamburg firm of Johann Oesar Godefroy planted itself at Api 
on Upolu Island and began to raise cotton for export. Within 
a little more than two decades suoh progress was made by this 
company that annexation rumors were rampant in Sydney, Austral-
la, and this, despite the emphatio statement of the Imperial 
Government that it had "no desire to aoquire the Samoan Islands, 
nor indeed any colonies for Germany.a57 
The first permanent American entry into the Samoa re-
gion took plaoe in 1872 when Commander R.W. Meade of the usa 
Narragansett conoluded a treaty with the native ohiefs for an 
exolusive naval station at Pago Pago. The United States Senate 
. 
disapproved of this move,58 however, and thus President Ulysses 
Grant sent Colonel A.B. Steinberger to the islands as his per-
sonal representative, an aotion whioh' soon ripened into a Samo 
desire for annexation by this oountry. Steinberger's deporta-
\ 
tiOD -- a result of Amerioan, British, and German oonsular jeal ' 
ousies59 -- ended in a vioious oivil war among the islanders. 
57 Sylvia Masterman, The Origins of International Ri 
~alrJ( in Samoa: 1854-1884, London;-Allen andirrnwin, 1~34, 79.-
uotes Russell to Deroy;-November 6, 1874. 
58 Samuel Flagg Bemis, ! Diplomatic [iator~ o~ the 
United States, New York, Henry Holt and 00., 19~6, 405-456; Eas 
terman, II~. Cites House Exeo. Dooument 161, 44 Congo, 1 Sess.,-3. 
59 George H. Ryden, ~ Foreig~ Polioy £! 1££ U.~. 
in Relation to Samoa, New Haven, Yale U. Press, 19~~, 140-147. 
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When the Germanstr1ed to ourb the violenoe, a paot of am1ty 
and med1at10n was negot1ated between the Samoans and Amer10a 
wh10h n10ely reserved the 1sl~nds for future Un1ted States own-
ership -- or at,least prevented the same from falling 1nto the 
hands of Br1tain or Germany.SO Yet, 1t so happened that these 
nations likewise oonoluded territor1al treaties with the Samoan 
• chiefs, aotions wh10h v1rtually foroed the establishment of a 
three-headed controll~ng un1t at Ap1a in 1879. 
Th1s preoarious politioal balanoe was still in ex1st-
enoe f1ve years later when Bismarck inaugurated his oolon1al 
plans. The Germans now took adv~~age of a nat1ve upr1s1ng and 
prooeeded tora1se the1r own flag over the territory, a move 
whioh brought a strong protest from the Amerioan Seoretary of 
state, Thomas Bayard. After unsuooessful disoussions, the mat-
ter went to President Grover Oleveland for settlement, but Bis-
marck, anxious to avoid further friotion with Amerioa,Sl sug-
gested a new meeting to take plaoe in Berlin in 1889. Here was , 
formed a tri-partite oondomin1um,S2 quite 1noompat1ble with Amer 
ioan traditions, but whioh endured for the entire next deoade. 
A final settlement, preoipitated by the Spanish-Amerioan War, 
60 Bemis, 455-456. 
61 Stolberg, xvii. 
63 Bem1s, 458, 8bB-S5S. 
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eventually divided the islands between the Ge%man Empire and 
the United States~ Great Britain receiving compensat10n 1n othe 
parts of the Pac1fic. 
The Samoan ep1socre- served two purposes worthy of no-
tice. First~ 1t not only gave an initial impetus to Amer10an 
imperialism 1n the Paoif1o~ but thUS paved the way for further 
fr1otion with the Reich in future years. Seoondly~ it forced 
1nto the open the first real indioat10n of German intent10ns to 
build a oolonial emp1re outside of Atrica~ and heralded the ar-
rival of a new and powerful element in internat10nal po11t1cs.53 
The stage was indeed set for an era of intense German-Amer1can 
ill aocord. 
A second focal point of German colonial interest 1n 
the Pacif1c during the late 1800's lay in the Philippine Is-
lands~ the la8t remnant of Spain's rapidly deo11ning empire. 64 
Muoh interest was directed toward these rioh lands when the Sp 
ish-American War began in 1898~ although the Reioh retained a 
str10t neutra11ty throughout the confliot. In the publio eye, 
however, Amerioa was sharply condemned for her imperialism, and 
the "defeat of the Un1ted States would undoubtedly have been 
83 Olara E. Sohieber, liThe Transformation of Ameri-
can Sent1ment toward Germany: 1870-1914," Journal of Interna-
tional Relations, Baltimore,Md., XII, 1921, 58. --
84 Oarroll, 414 • 
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pOPular. lle5 In faot, a viotory by this country was widely 
viewed as surely to be ~ollowed by "other atterJlPes to impose 
(J 
Amerioa's will on Europe. 1I65 
By the early summer of 1898 even the diplomacy of 
Prinoe Bernhard von Bulow,6? the German ohanoellor, had failed 
to win any portion of the Philippines for the Empire. Conse-
quently, a German fleet of five vessels arrived in Manila ~y 
on June 20, presumably to take over the islands, either in oase 
the United States did not keep them58 or decided to reward the 
Reioh for its neutrality.59 In the weeks that followed, Admir-
al Diederiohs, the German oommander, not only seriously vio-
lated the blookade,70 but at one time arranged his fleet into 
what seemed to·be a battle position -- a move whioh had to be 
disoouraged by British naval intervention. 71 
All this may seem unimportant to the oasual reader. 
Nevertheless, in 1898 Amerioans at home were quiok to suspeot 
297. 
55 
65 
Ibid., 412. 
-Ibid. Oites Historisob-Politische Blatter, OXXII 1 
. 67 Lester B. Shippee, nGermany and the Spanish-Ameri 
can War," American Historioal ReView, XXX, 1925, 764-765; Town-
send, 193. 
68 Shippee, 765, 774. 
69 Townsend, 194. 
70 Thomas A. Bailey, 'Dewey and the Germans at Man-
ila Bay," American Historical Revi8~, LXV, Ootober, 1939, 64-65. 
71 Ibid., 80 
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suoh German aoti~~~ies and attitudes, however they may have bee 
1ntended. 72 The Manila inoidents, more than tho Samoan affair, 
caused considerable ill-feeling'in both oountries, and helped 
, 
very muoh to prepare Amerio~and Germany for their respective 
roles in the great world confliot which was to come. This an-
tagonism was further intensified when the United States demand-
• ed and reoeived the entire Philippine arohipeligo from Spain. 
As one German source put it, this ~s a oase of the "shameless 
explOitation of their opponents' weakness" which the Americans 
would some day regret. 73 
From the turn of theoentury until the First World W 
German-Amerioan antagonism continued unabated. The colonial 
area shifted, however, from the Paoifio to the Oaribbean where-
in the pompous Reioh sought to obtain a foothold, despite the 
preponderanoe there of American eoonomio interests. Too, great 
ly offensive to ~he Germans at this time was the Monroe Doctrin 
even Bismarck had oalled it an Ainternational impertinende" 
and a "speoies of arroganoe peculiarly American· 74 -- and thus, 
to override it would have been most gratifying to the Foreign 
Office in Berlin. 
72 ,Ibid., 75-77, 80-81. 
73 Oarroll, 416-417. 
74 Sohieber, 64. 
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The ~pire,' 8 first real ohanoe?5 to ac~ in aooordance 
w1th its ambit10ns oame in 1902 when it joined~1th several 
other European nations in aohastising" the Venezuelan governmen 
for default 1n the payment --of its debts. When Amer10a was 
sounded and found to be unopposed to suoh aotion provided that 
no lasting oooupat10n was attempted,?6 the powers blockaded and 
bombarded several ports on the South Amerioan ooast. ~ Later, 
however, the Germans hinted at a atemporary oocupation," so Sec 
retary of state John Hay was forced to invoke the Monroe Doc-
trine and to call for arbitration of all claims by representa-
tives of the United States. The Germans hesitated, but soon ac 
quiesoed as Amerioan publio opinion beoame aroused and a fleet 
under Dewey was mobilized off Puerto Rioo.?? 
Throughout the Venezuelan episode, newspapers in the 
United States denounoed the German aotion, agreeing that the 
pr1mary objeot was to test the real strength of the Monroe Doc-
trine. Moreover, Americans believed that the Reich actually 
wanted not a settlement of debts but a permanent ocoupation of 
terr1tory near the proposed Panama Oanal. 78 The entire affa1r, 
soon followed by intrigues in Denmark to blook Amer1can purchas 
75 Other suspioious moves had been made in Hait1 in 
1897, and 1n the Santa Margarita Islands off Venezuela 1n 1901. 
76 Bemis, 522. Oites Vagts, Weltpo11t1k, II, 1540. 
77 Ib1d., 522-524. 
78 Sohieber, 65-66. 
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of the Danish West Indies 79 oaused further distrust in the 
. , 
! United States of German amb1tions, and engendered a fear of the 
i 
.. 
Emp1re's mi11tar1sm and 1mperia11sm. Th1s att1tude finally at-
tained such prevalenoe that 1n the years preoeding 1914, the 
.---
Kaiser himself, lithe heaviest liab11ity wh10h Germany oarried 
in her foreign policy from 1888 to 1918,·80 came to be regarded 
as a veritable symbol of aggression, autocracy, and Weltpoliti~. 
He and his nat10n beoame particularly obnoxious to the American 
people between Algeoiras and Sarejevo, when they generally fa-
vored paoifioism and arbitration as means of settling interna-
tional dis~utes.81 
The final culmination of almost a half-oentury of 
commercial and colon1al r1valry between Germany and the United 
states ooourred 1n 1917 when Amer1ca joined the Allies against 
the Reioh in World War I. This event was not entirely caused, 
of oourse, by the ill-will of prev10us years, but suoh long-
standing antagonism d1d aot as an important faotor in influ~c­
ing the Amer1can people to make their final de01sion. 
Throughout the first three years Of the European war, 
Amerioa was offioially neutral, although most sympathy in this 
79 T.W. Arnold, German Ambitions as They Affect Brit-
ain and the United States of America, New YorK, G.P."Putnam's 
sons and-Sm1th, Elder and co., i9~, 34-51; Bemis, 521-522. 
80 Sohieber, 68. 
81 Ibid., 68-69. 
-
, 
i 
I 
r 
I 
f 
I 
i 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
, 
I 
I 1~----------------------------------------------------------~ I 
i 
I 
I 
25 
country lay with the ,Allies.sa This posit10n, w1th a corres-
ponding antipathy towards the Reioh, beoame pre~alent soon afte 
the invasion of Belgium by the Kaiser's armies, and grew sO 
strong with the subsequent ~arrage of propaganda that 
(b]efore long it became an artiole of faith 
with the man in the street that the Kaiser 
(known as the "Beast of Berlin") had wanton-
ly provoked the war; (and] when he had won 
it he would come over with millions of spiked 
helmets and make short work of the United 
states and the Monroe Doctrine • • .83 
As in several previous wars, the United States was 
the most important neutral oarrier, and again as usual, her 
rights were trampled upon by the ahief combatants. Violations 
by the Allied powers were often just as serious as those of Ger 
many, but while the cost from the first figured only in dollars, 
the seoond type of friction was soon found to mean the loss of 
Amerioan lives.a4 The Germans early pressed the government at 
Washington to halt the selling of war goods to the Allies, but 
when President Wilson defended America's right to oontinue such 
sales, the Reioh decided to pursue a stronger course of aotion. 
As a result, in a war zone set up around the British Isles, 
three ships -- inoluding the Lusitania -- were sunk by mid-19l5, 
82 Bailey, 612. 
83 1,lli., 614. 
, 
84 Said the Boston Globe in this regard: "One is a I' 
gang of thieves, the other a gang of murderers. On the whole, 1'1' 
prefer the thieves ••• as the lesser of two evils." Builey, 646. 
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with the consequent loss of over one hundred thirty American 
oitizens. SS 
.. 
This last act inoensed the enti~. nation against the 
. 
Germans. As the New York Nation framed it: 
The torpedo that sank the Lusitania also sank 
Germany in the opinion of mankind. • • It is 
,at onoe a crime and a monumental folly • • • • 
She has affronted the moral sense of the 
world and saorifioed her standing among the 
nations-S6 
The United States government protested the sinking or its ships 
and received German assuranoes of no recurrenoe,S? although it 
was not until February of the next year that the Reich agreed 
to assume liability for Amerioan losses on the Lusitania. 
Such pledges were broken and renewed several times by \ 
the Germans before the end of 1916. Toward the olose of Januar 
of the followlng year, however, the Imperlal foroes were in suc 
straits that the Berlin government felt lt neoessary to resume 
unrestricted submarine warfare, and thus to stake all on a fina 
\ 
Victory. This was soon followed by the publication in American 
. 
newspapers of seoret German dlplomatic advances to Mexlco pro-
mising her large traots of western land if she were to ally her 
S5 Balley, 626. 
86 Ibid., 627. Cltes New York Nation, May 13, 1915. 
87 ~., 630. Quotes ~ Memolrs ~ Lansing, 48. 
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self ~1th the R~1oh,1n a war against the Un1ted States. SS Th1s 
information plus oontinued sinkings oaused euoh ~ wave of anti-
German sentiment to sweep the oountry that Oongress f1nally de-
I 
" olared war aga1nst the Imperial government on Apr11 6, 1917. 
The final ohapter, then, of German-Amer1can relations 
before 1919 was wr1tten in the blood of both countrymen during 
i 
the olosing years of the r1rst World War. When the end came in 
November, 1915, Bismarok's Empire existed no longer; only the 
German people remained to build anew upon its ashes. The great 
problems of reoonstruotion, of politioal reorganization, and 
above all, of eoonomio and diplomatio reconc1l1at1on w1th Ameri 
ca and the world faced the battered Re1ch. It is, then, to a 
detailed aocount of these post-war developments -- n~w l1nks 
1n the long ohain of inter-relations between the United States 
and Germany -- that this investigat10n now turns its attent1on. 
88 Ib1d., 642-643. 
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OHAPTER II 
THE BEGINNINGS 'or A lEW AMITY 
.. --
uPon the signing of the Armistice in November, 1918, 
a new ohapter began in the long history of German-American re-
lations. The oiroumstanoes surrounding this ohange oould noi 
be called auspicious ones, however, for with a baokground of 
distrust, rivalry, and finally open warfare, the wounds that 
needed healing were many indeed. A mutual feeling of enmity, 
whether warranted by faots or not, had reaohed its climax in 
the struggle just ended, and thus it would seem that a long 
period of political and so01al oonvalescence was necessary be- . 
. 
fore a return to normal interoourse ~ould be reaohed. 
Publio opinion, both in Amerioa and in the Reich, was 
quite divided for some time af~er the war. Yet, it ~an be said 
in general that a stronger anti-German feeling prevailed among 
the people of the United States than was manifested against 
America by the Germans in Europe. Strangely enough, even the 
Weimar Republio, different as it was from the former imperial 
regime, oame in for muoh oriticism in Amerioan newspapers and 
periodicals, ohiefly beoause of the belief that its leaders did 
not intend to fulfill the terms of the Versailles Treaty. This 
28 
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: notion grew up among 0 Amerioans beoause of German statements re-
o, 
garding the injustice of the Paris pact. ror e.~pl., short-
ly after the Germans had been handed the pe~oe terms, Dr. Her-
. 
man MUller, the Minister of~oreign Affairs in the Reich, was 
quoted as s~ying: 
Yielding to superior foroes, and without re-
nounoing in the meantime its own view of the 
peaoe oonditions, the Government of the Ger-
man Republio deolares that it is ready to ao-
oept and sign the oonditions of peace im-
posed·l . 
Again, Premier Gustav Bauer opined that by the peaoe terms Ger-
many was 
violated body and soul to the horror of the 
world •••• Let us sign, but it is our 
hope to the last breath that this attempt 
against our honor may one day recoil against 
its authorS.a 
Even Vorw!rts, the Sooialist sheet and semi-governmental organ, 
made the following statement: 
New York, 
Extortionate pressure renders signature of 
the Peaoe Treaty worthless. We must never 
forget it is only a sorap of paper. Treat-
ies based on violenoe oan keep their valid-
ity only so long as foroe exists. Do not 
loae hope. The resurreotion day oomes.3 
Taking these statements at their faoe value, many 
1 "Future Relations with Germany," 
Funk and Wagnalls 00., LXII, July 5, 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
-
Literary Digest, 
r~l~, 2i. 
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Amerioan pressm~n filled their readers with highly emotional 
and rashly-put accusations against the German people as a 
whole. The New York Oommercial neatly summarized its opinion 
u 
in these words: .... -
, Does there exist a power, within or without, 
that can bring to Germany the moral regener-
ation without whioh she oan never reoover 
the respeot of·mankind?4 
Similarly, the St. Louis Star aocused the Republic of being a 
disarmed triokster rather than a reformed 
conspirator (and thus will obey the Versailles 
Treaty] only to the extent that compliance 
is foroed by .the Allies. 5 
Another editor, this time of the Baltimore·Sun, said in the 
strongest tones: 
The Huns run true to form • • • • Who oan 
have anything but oontempt for such a nation 
of liars, fiends, and hypootrites as Germany 
has proved itself to be'6 
Finally, a direot attack upon the Weimar government 
oame out in the Philadelphia Publio Ledger. This newspaper 
oited the sinking of the German fleet at Soapa Flow and the , 
burning of oertain Frenoh battle-flags as proof of the treaoh-
ery to be expeoted of a nation as evil as the Reioh. The 
Ebert regime was desoribed as follows: 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
---~--- --
There are abundant reasons to doubt the bona-
fides of the German 'Republio' and to aooept 
the theory that the 'revolution' has been 
from the first the oover under which an un-
reformed and unrepentent nation hoped 'to es-
oape the ignominy of defeat and shift to mere 
puppets the responsi~ility both for the ac-
ceptance and tJle subsequent evasion of peace 
conditions which Germany has no intention of 
fulfilling.? 
31 
It seems, then, that a distrustful attitude remained 
long among the Amerioan people.8 Some newspaper and periodidal 
souroes tried to overoome this wartime anti-Germanism by ap-
pealing to a reasonable approaoh to the question, especially 
through the medium of trade. Yet, even this was hard to ac-
complish beoause few businessmen had respeot for Germans and 
German-made goods. The Wall Street Journal had this to say: 
It would be diffioult to make a German see the 
loathing and oontempt withwhioh he is regard-
ed by large numbers of people with whom he for-
merly did business on equal terms. The label 
'Made in Germany' in this oountry, Franoe, and 
the British Empire will damn artioles of Ger-
man manufacture as long as the memory of bad 
faith, oruelty, and arroganoe endures.9 
Nevertheless, the same newspaper pOinted out the faot that 
Germany must be kept alive to work out her own 
salvation in fear and trembling. But it would 
? Ib1d., 22. 
8 Other examples of Amerioan anti-Germanism are re-
corded in Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, 
.New York, Macmillan 00., 1944, 305=306. - -
23 • 
9 "Future Relations with Germany,n Literarx Digest, 
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be folly to' deny that living down her past 
reoord will dissipate the few illusions the 
German people have left to them -10 .. 
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The St. Louis Republic was more level-headed about 
this matter, for 1t saw that--1n 
some way or other Germany must trade, and the 
nations of the earth must be reasonable 1n 
this regard. Where trade with Germany 1s 
benefioial on both sides and does no injustice 
to those countries that Germany despoiled, 
trade with Germany should be resumed;. for, 
otherwise the Germans oan not meet their ob-
ligations abroad and oppose Bolshevism at 
home. Prejudice against Germany and German-
made goods is inevitable, but the more rapid-
ly it gives way to calmly reasoned policy the 
better • • - -11 
Aoross the At1antio l however. a somewhat different 
attitude was exhibited by the defeated Germans toward the Unite 
. 
States.' It would seem that an intense hatred should have been 
shown in most qU8%ters toward that one nation wh1ch l by aiding 
the Allies,' bad snatched the fruita of viotory from a proud and 
powerful Germany about to administer the ooup ~'~~race to he: 
,.",t' ';','''. 
struggling enemies. Like"ise l a large degree''o~'~~sonal coo-
" . I f..' ,,'" 
tempt might have well been expected for Woodrow Wilson, who, as 
President, epitomized the Amerioan people and all they stood 
for. Yet, the German populaoe seems not to have formed either 
10 Ibid. 
-
11 Ibid. 
-
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of these attitudes·to. any extent,12 but rather ohose to view 
America and her leader not so muoh as former enemies, but more 
.. 
, 
as future benefactors. VorwArts, the Socialist paper, whether 
. 
actually in earnest or in searoh for sympathy, printed the fol-
lowing eulogy on the American nation and Pres~dent: 
It was wholly and solely the entry of the 
United States into the war which brought a 
final victory to the Entente. It is now 
the Sacred duty of the United States to see 
that this victory does not degenerate into 
debauch of cruelty, revenge, and oppress-
ion. It was the adoption of the high ideals 
set forth in your peaoe program by the Ger-
man democracy which brought German militar-
ism and autocracy to the ground. And now 
the liberated peoples of Oentral Europe, Mr. 
President, expeot you to carry out what you 
had promised them and what· your allies had 
accepted as the basis of peaoe. The people 
of the German Republio look to you as the 
most powerful of statesmen to use that in- . 
fluenoe whioh today weighs more heavily than 
that of any other man, to establish the 
foundations upon whioh the United Republios 
of Europe may be built, thus giving exist-
ence to something whieb the fanatio nation-
alists in all lands have hitherto thought 
impossible·13 
Another tribute was paid to Wilson by members of the 
German Armistioe Oommission, who oonoluded their report in 1920 
by,saying: 
, 
, \ 
This'volWlle: 'shows what the Armistice oon4-1-
tions mean to Germany. Unfortunately they 
are not designed to oarry out the grea. aim 
which President Wilson .proolaimed in his ~ 
speech of the Fourth of July, 1918, in the 
words: "What we seek is the re1gn of law, 
based upon the consent of the governed and 
susta1ned by the organ1zed opin10n of man-
kind·"14 
Even the oommon people of Germany, while heaping 
coals upon the heads of the European Entente, showed 11ttle et-
ldence of oynioism or feeling of revenge against the Unlted 
States. A few Germans, no doubt, agreed w1th a "lead1ng c1ti-
zen and wholesale wine merchant" who was quoted as being of 
the op1nion that the idea of the g1gantic indemnity 
oame from Amerioa, where money 1s ten t1mes 
as abundant as 1t is here (Germany]. '1'0 
Americans this sum may not sound so 1noal-
culable. But to us Germans -- oh, no, that· 
will have to be ohangedo15 
Nevertheless, this idea was not widespread in the Reich. More 
of the average people probably agreed with a barber who said of 
Wilson that if he 
sticks to his Fourteen Polnts, and w. believe 
he will, I oan assure you right now that a 
14 J. El11s Barker, "The Present State of Feeling in 
Germany,· The ~arterls Revlew, New York, Leonard Soott Publis 
1ng Co., cOXXX ,Octo er, 1920, 316. QuotesDle Deutsche Waf-
fenst11lstande Komm1ss10n, Mater1alen betreffena-dle Waffen=--
stillstandeverbandlungen, OhariottenbUl'g, 1920, Teil VIII. 
15 liThe Cortunon People of Germany on the 'Peace Treaty II 
Literary Digent, LXII, July 12, 1919, 70-76. 
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monument will be ereoted to him ln Germany, 
not simply in the memories of the peopla, but 
an actual .ontiment of stone and bronzeJ ~w1th 
appropriate lnscriptionselS ' 
In the same way, a'~£stinguished physlclan", bellevlng that 
35 
tbe treaty terms were "frightful," claimed that the money could 
never be pald. YetI he stl1l seemingly looked to the Presi-
dent for guidanoe by asking, "Where are Wilson's Fourteen • 
points?"l? 
Finally, a rather frank fellow explained his stand 
quite well when he said without malice: 
If America had never sent ammunition to the 
Allies, and there was no reason why she should, 
we would never have sunk your boats • • • • 
You forced us to give you an excuse for declar-
ing war against us. Then came \'ilson and his 
Fourteen Points. I have never seen such en-
thusiasm for a man and a oause as was manifest-
ed at that time in Germany for Wilson and his 
doctrine. He thereby inveigled us into the 
armistioe. We had • • • soldiers, • • • ammu-
nition, ••• and unshaken determination and 
will power. But we stopt [sio] since there was 
no reason for our oontinuing the war, Wilson 
having assured us ot all we wanted. • • • And 
now we have the terms of peaoe. The Fourteen ' 
Points are nowhere to be found. Wilson has put 
his foot in it (~ sich blamiert) ~efore the 
whole world • • • .18 
Opinion in both countries, of course, did not remain 
static, but rather tended gradually to soften as the war faded 
16 ru,g,. 
17 ~. 
18 Ibid., 7~. 
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into the backgro~d. Consequently, it was during the first 
five years after 1918 that the more important steps were taken 
to revive German-American frie~dship. This rapproohement pro-
gressed rather slowly, howeve~, for during the first two and 
one-half years after the armistioe an offioial state of war 
still existedrbetween the two oountries, and thus relations 
~ 
tended to be extremely 0001, formal, and very muoh restrioted 
to necessities. Most of the interoourse whioh did ooour oame 
about through private trading, although as soon as it beoame 
evident Lthat the Treaty of Versailles would not be aocepted, 
weak political ties were effeoted whioh were intended to serve 
as temporary .faoilities during the extens1ve 1nterim. 
Ind1vidual interests and 'pre-oooupations, moreover, 
aoted further to oomplioate matters, for the Germans, war-weary 
and 1n the throes of revolut10n, were hard pressed with suoh im 
mediate home problems as the establishment of the republio, the 
conolusion of a peaoe based upon the harsh terms of Versailles, 
and above all, the solving of the terrible question of starva-
tion. The first of these problems took pre-eminence over the 
others, for a suooessful politioal ohange was needed both as a 
defense against radioal Bolshevism and as a means of winning 
more generous terms from the viotoriousAllies. 19 
19 It will be remembered that Wilson, in late 1918, 
Offered peaoe terms based upon the Fourteen Points if the Hohen 
37 
This transition was made in a legal mann~r several 
days before the armistioe when Prince Max of Baden" the Imper- . 
1al Ohanoellor, handed over his ,offioe to Fri$derio~~bert, a 
humble leather-worker and member of the Sooial Demooratio par-
ty.20 A provisional oabinet was formed whioh, after waging a 
suooessful fight against the Bolshevists, gave way to an eleot-
• 
ed legislature oalled the Reiohstag in February, 1919. Ebert 
was ohosen President, while the ohanoellorship went to his 
oolleAgUe, Philip Soheidemann. In the legislature, however, 
jihe Sooialists held only one hundred eighty-five out of three 
hundred ninety-nine seats,2l and therefore it was plain that a 
regime based purely upon this party's prinoiples was out of the 
question. Signifioantly enough, at no time in the history of 
the Republio did this situation ~prove, but rather it remained 
to plague the German government with instability and laok of 
faith on the part of the people themselves. The German revolu-
zoellern war-lords were OVerthrown. It is very probable that 
the old imperial government might have been retained had it not 
been for this event. "Oorrespondenoe between the United States 
and Germany Regarding an Armistioe," Amerioan Journal of Inter-
national Law, 1919, XIII, 85-96; Bailey, Loat Peaoe, ~67 
20 Robert Ergang, Europe in ~ Time, New York, D.C. 
Heath and Company, 1949, 119. 
21 Ibid., 121. 
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t10n, then, oanno~'be ,said to have made a oomplete break with 
the past, but to have ereoted in the plaoe of the former regime 
only a superfio1al po;l1t1cal expedient wh10h left the old so-
o 
oial and eoonomio struoture ihtaot. 
Despite these great hand1oaps, however, the new 
government toiled from February to August, 1919, in framing a 
constitution for the new Reioh. • Its efforts were not in vain, 
for in the oompleted dooument there was embodied one of the fin 
est examples of liberal demooraoy known to the world at that 
time. As opposed to the fundamental law of the old empire, 
whioh was essentially a treaty between rulers, the new const1tu 
t10n gave expression to theewill of the sovereign German people 
as voiced through their representatives, for it began:, aThe Ger 
man state is a republioj politioal authority springs from the 
peoPle. naa Yet, it was not intended to oompletely unify the na 
tion, for it provided that the old states, new termed Lander, 
\ 
should retain their own oonst1tutions and sovereign governments. 
In other words, republioan Germany was to be oonstituted on a 
federal basis. 
The Weimar Republio under Ebert, then, was destined t 
remain the Reich's offioial ruling organ for the next fourteen 
22 Ibid., 124 
-
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years. It was, a~ove'all, that regime with whioh the surren-
der had been negotiated, and whose responsib1lity~lt now was 
to deal with the European Enten~e' and America regarding peaoe 
terms. As will be explained·presently, this resulted in a 
certain olose relationship -- rarely considered in connection 
with the Paris oonference -- which oame into existenoe between 
the United States and Germany. 
It will be remembered that, through the efforts of 
the idealistio Wilson, Germany had consented to oall a halt to 
the war, and thus the Reich justly looked forward to a fair 
peaoe based upon the Fourteen POints. 23 This turn of events 
placed the United States squarely between the Allies and Ger-
many, for, due to the inclusion of suoh prinoiples as those of 
freedom of tne seas and of self-determination, the Amerioan 
delegates were neoessarily ob11ged to defend oerta1n German 
rights as well as those of other peoples, and therefore oould 
not rightfully co-operate to the fullest extent with their vio-
I 
L 
torious assooiates. This situation was further complioated by 
the British refusal to even oonsider the re-organization of 
maritime laws, as suggested by Wilson's Second Point, for by 
this aot Amerioa, for all praotioal purposes, was ejected from 
23 Bailey, ~~ Peaoe, 36. 
, 
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the Allied tribunal. One author24 goes so far as to imply that 
her only real conoern, and the one for which the United States 
.. 
fought against Germany, was thus·eliminated. If this is true,25 ] 
then from that time forward, .Jf1lson and h1s oolleagues remained 
in Europe more to fulfill the role of arb1tors than actually to 
partioipate in a peace oonferenoe. 
Woodrow Wilson failed, for the most part, to realiz~ 
his lofty dreams. The Allies, espeoially Franoe, were deter-
mined to satisfy their own particular desires, and thus one by 
one the prinoiples upon which the German people: expected their 
future to be based were. rejeoted at Paris, and in their place 
a mass of vindiotive clauses were organized into what oame to 
~ 
be known as the Treatj of Versailles. The Reioh was handed a 
stone where bread was expeoted, for it was despoiled of much of 
its land and population, ocoupied in part by Allied troops, 
plaoed under a crushing burden of reparations, and made to ac-
oept the entire responsibility tor the late world war. 2S It can 
be said in truth that, though self-determ1nation remained the 
Allied watohword, it was applied in almost every case except in 
24 Guglielmo Ferrero, "Amerioa's Role in the Peace 
Drama," The L~Vin~ Ag~, Boston, The Living Age Co., CCCVII, Nov-
ember 13, 19~0, ;) 7-;) 2. Reprinted from La Revue de Geneva, 
September, 1920. -- , --
25 Bailey, ~ Lost Peaoe, 44-45. 
26 Treat~ ~ Versailles, Parts III and VIII. 
, 
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that of'Germany ~d hhr fellow Oentral Powers. In'the end, 
then, Wilsonian idealism oame to nought. .. 
The Paris Peace Oonference remained in session from 
, 
't 
January 12, 1919 to the time~~f presentation of the treaty to 
the German delegation on May 7. An opportunity to study the 
terms was given to the delegates, but all protests were futile. 
~ 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch stood at the head of a large French army 
ready to march into the Reich if the terms were rejeoted, and 
so on June 28, 1919 the treaty was reluotantly signed by the re-
presentatives of the new republio in the same Hall of Mirrors at 
Versailles where, in 1871, the birth of the German Empire had 
taken place. 27 
As soon as possible after the olosing of the, confer-
ence, Wilson sped home to Washington to induce the United States 
Senate to aocept the Versailles Paot. Yet, within four months 
after its presentation to that august body, the Paris document 
was read, revised,' and rej ected. 28 This ocourred primarily b'e-
cause the treaty and its ratification were laid open to the 
evils of partisan polltlcs, themselves the result of a faotious 
struggle which was being waged in the United States between the 
27 Balley,.,lli Lost Peaoe, 288-303. 
28 Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Be-
trayal, New York, The Macmillan 00., 1945, passIm; George A. --
Finch, 'The Treaty ofPeaoe with Germany in the United States 
Senate,· International Oonoi1iation, New York, No. 153, August 
1920. ' 
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forces of nationali,sm and of internationalism. Thus, the Amer-
ican people, weary of war and shaken by the selfish v1ndictive-
.. 
ness of their former comrades-in~arm8, were easily convinced 
that to withdraw 1nto a smug isblation and to search out the 
blessings of "normalcy· was abetter choice than to accept the 
vast responsibilities bequeathed to them by the war. Wilson 
and all he stood for were quickly exchanged for a chance to • 
frolic in a contented complacency while the rest of the world 
struggled with the problems of peace. 
This turn of events bad a profound effeot upon Ameri-
can relations with Germany, for, while Wilson still remained in 
office for more than a year, the Al11ed-American split, 1nitiat-
ed when the second of the President's Fourteen POints ,had been 
rejected by the"Br1tish, was now completed. The path was laid 
open for the United States, no longer fettered to Europe, short-
ly to negotiate a formal peace with the Reich, and to begin 
aga1n the normal diplomatic relations which ~he war had inte%-
rupted. These changes did not manifest themselves for almost 
two years after 1919, but during that lapse of time a distinctl 
d1fferent and more friendly attitude began to be shown toward 
the Reich. Except for W11son's veto of a separate peaoe treaty 
in May, 1920,29 American relations with Germany were, off1cial-
2S Papers Relating ~ the Foreign Relations £f the 
United States, Pal'is Peaoe Oonference, Wash1ngton, D.C., United 
" ............ -.-~ - - --~ ----....".. .... ~ ... "" ...--.""""'"'~~......-.,l'"' ___ " ...... ___ ' ;___ _ 
, 
11 at least, slo~ly returning to normal. 
One factor· which undoubtedly oontributed greatly to-
ward the abatement of German-Amer1can antagon1sm was the order-
. 
ly and non-vindiot1ve occupat10n of the Rhineland by the troops 
of the United States. .This event began with the armistioe nego-
tiations themselves, for Artiole I of the surrender document pr 
vided that the 
distriots [on the left bank of the Rhine] 
shall be administered by the looal author-
ities under the oontrol of the Allied and 
United States armies of ocoupat10n.30 
Th1s same document also named the spec1fic areas to be 
oooupied, whioh inoluded the entire Rhineland and three bridge-
heads, each eighteen miles in radius, situated east of the 
Rhine river'at Mainz, Ooblenz, and Oologne. A neutral zone of 
s1x miles was to be left between the Allied occupied areas and 
the rest of Germany.31 
America, then, beoame one of the ohief oocupying pow-
ers in the Reich, and consequently was foroed to oontinue her 
presenoe in Europe long after the war. Designed a8 the unit 
to hold the Rhineland was the newly organized Third Army under 
States Government Printing Office, 1947, XIII, 15-16. Wilson's 
veto message can be found in House Dooument 799, 66 Cong., 2nd 
Sess10n. 
;SO Ibid., 763. 
31 Battle Monuments Commission, American Armies ~ 
Battlefields in Euro~, Washington, D.C. 1 U.S. Government Print-Ing 01'£ioe, '1'9'3"8, 49. See map on page 44 of this thesis. 
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the oommand of Maj,or General Joseph '1'., Dickman. The advanoe 
, 
of these troops was so regulated that entranoe w~a made into 
cities in Luxembourg almost upon the heels of the evaouating 
. 
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German soldiers. Beginning its maroh six days after the surren-
der, the oooupation army reaohed the German frontier on Novem-
ber 23; by Deoember 9, leading units had already taken up posi-
tions on the Rhine. The river itself was orossed on th~ 13th 
-
, 
" 
" 
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sO that the Amerioans~ight oooupy the bridgehead assigned to f 
them beyond the oity of OOblenz.32 • f 
Within one month after .the great surrender United 
; 
St'ates forces were in' complet~ control of their seotor in Ger-
many and were ready to take up their duties as directed by 
Marshal Fooh, supreme commander in Europe. The occupation it-
self was greeted in some places rather sullenly~ while in • 
others more enthusiasm was shown. In Trier (Treves)~ one of 
the first spots to be entered~ the doughboys were met with a 
"glowering mien~" as one report put it~ and there were "no 
flags, no oheers~ no smiles~ no tears. It was just such a re-
ception as only the boche could give. n33 The soldiers them-
selves had "nothing of the popular oonception of a oonquering 
. 
army about them,n but yet were 'solemn-taoed lads~ business-
like and quiet, and above all~ ready for whatever was to come. u3 
At Ooblenz the reoeption was Bomewhat different~ for 
1n that city less want prevailed, and oonsequently the troop~ 
were met by "smiling delegations [of] pretty girls (who] waved 
hands and handkerch1efs."35 In add1t10n, the mayor of that oit 
32 ~., 489. 
33 II TrooprJ40vements Under the Armistioe ~" Current 
Histor~ Mafiaz1ne, New York Times Publishing 00., IX~ January, 
-mi9, t. t:;, 15. 
34 ~., 16. 
;,)5 ~., 17. 
4S 
bad issued a proolamation forbidding all aots of disoourtesy 
and violenoe~ and ordering suoh assistanoe as was ',possible to 
.. 
be aocorded the Americans. 
The Germans tended tD some plaoes to sneer at the 
Yankee oocupiers, although in the smaller towns the men were 
well treated. The Volkszeitung of Mayen, where the Third Army 
established its first headquarters, said of the troops as e~­
ly:as mid-December, 1918, that they were 
well behaved~ their interoourse with the 
people is oorreot, and we willingly admit 
that the Americans are good fellows. aS 
The Rhineland oocupation, of oourse, was an inter-
Allied operation~ and not entirely Amerioan in nature. There-
fore~ the ohief oommander remained Marshal Ferdinand Fooh, who 
was striot but not harsh in his treatment of the German popu-
laoe. No troops exoept offioers were billeted on the local in-
habitants~37 and every oare was taken to lighten the burdens of 
these people. When the troops had been in position for some \ 
time~ ourfews were lifted by the looal oommanders, and telephone 
communioation with the rest of Germany was allowed. Mail regu-
lations, too, were shortly relaxed, but meetings, politioal and 
otherwise were rather striotly oontrolled exoept where they took 
36 ~. ~ loS. 
37 "Agreement with Reiard to the Military 
of the Territories of the Rhine,' Foreign Relations, 
Conference, XIII, 766-767. 
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the torm 01' ohUroh gatherings. Above all, groups of BOlsheviks " 
that were enoountered .were usually disbanded, tor no other 
I" 
~8 government than that of Ebert and Soheidemann was reoognized • 
. 
All in all, great taot was thus shown in not interfering with 
I 
the ordinary life of the people, beoause this added to the gen-
~ 
eral painlessness of the whole oooupation. As one writer put 
it: 
American oontrol is the mildest oonoeivable, 
or in any case far less than that of the 
Belgians at Aix an~:JUlloh and even more tol-
erant than that of the Frenoh at Mayence • e 
• e The Americans always say that they cherish 
absolutely no hatred for Germany, and their 
atti tude oonfirms this • e. • .39 
Reports show that the Rhinelanders were never duly 
opposed to the American oooupation,40 tor they oould see that 
it was only of temporary duration. Moreover, the troops were 
better liked than the Frenoh or British, for they not only sbar 
their luxuries -- newspapers, magazines, sweets and such --
with the population, but also spent large amounts of money in' 
the oountry. Too, the labor problem was partly alleviated by 
the presence of Amerioan forces, for numerous Germans were hire 
by the occupiers. Thus, while four thousandijobless Germans 
38 Gregory Mason, "How the Allies Govern Oocupied 
Germany," 1he Outlook, New York, The Outlook 00., CXXI, April 2, 
1919, 558-5~. 
;;9 "German Impressions of Amerioan Troops," The Liv-
ing ~, February 22, 1919, 455-456. --- ---
40 Elbert F. Baldwin,"The American Forces in Ger-L many," The Outlook~ OXXII, August 27, 1919, 635-636. 
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wandered the streets in January, 1919, only one out of ten was I 
without work by the middle of April. 41 Finally,.the Americans 
. , 
served as a fine protective de~ioe for the Rhenish inhabitants 
against the dreaded rule of the Bolsheviks, so that when the 
army was preparing to leave, the Germans aotually requested that 
it remain. 42 
On the whole, then, the Rhineland oocupation was not 
only a sucoessful endeavor, but also an indirect boon to a re-
newed Amerioan friendship with the Reich. Certainly there was 
little vindiotiveness on the part of Americans in Germany, and 
the temporary nature of the sojourn was plainly indicated by 
the oontinued dwindling of the oocupying force. Too, an oppor-
tunity was provided for both Yanks and "Boche" to see eaoh 
other in a new light, and while disagreements and unpleasant oc-
currances were not unoommon, samplings from eaoh of the two 
nations were given a ohance to dispel many of the misoonoeptions 
\ 
whioh had evolved during the war. Many doughboys for the first 
time saw the Germans as real human beings, and not as the beast-
ial figments of propaganda, so that they oould say, as one aot-
ually did, that: 
41 Ibid • 
............ 
42 ForeifI Relations, Paris Peaoe Conference, XIII, 
777; 1922, II, 214- 15. 
, i 
The war has made us belieye that foroe is the 
only language a Boche understands. But the 
Rhinelander;at least may have been slo,,~y learn-
ing another .43 '. , 
49 
The American foroes remained in Germany only until 
.'--
the beginning of 1923, when they were removed entirely. Since 
nO quota, either in time or personnel, had been agreed upon for 
the occupation, it is not surprising to note that the original 
.. , I . 
. ". 
body of two hundred fifty thousand soldiers had fallen to 
twelve thousand by January, 1920.44 Six months earlier the 
Third Army itself had been dissolved, leaving only a small con-
tingent of men known as the IlAmerican Forces in Germany," a 
constantly dwindling unit which remained on the Rhine about 
three years. The final withdrawal was hastened by the Senate's 
rejection of the Versailles Treaty, the separate peace 'made 
with Germany in 1921, and by dissatisfaotion both with French 
and Belgian politioal maohinations and with Amerioan difficult-
ies in reoeiving a just share of reparations payments to covet 
the oost of the occupation. 45 
Aooordingly, on Maroh 22, 1922 Seoretary of War John 
w. Weeks instructed the oommanding general in the Rhineland to 
43 Baldwin, -American Foroes,· 636. 
776. 
44 Foreign Relations, Paris Peaoe Conferenoe, XIII, 
45 D.H. Miller, U Cost of Amerioan 'l'roops on the 
Rhine," Curr~nt liisto~l' XVI, July, 1922, 614-616; Foreign~­
lations, 1922, 218-234; 1923, II, 110-192. 
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withdraw the Amer10an ,troops before June 30.48 This order drew 
protests not only from the Frenoh, Brit1sh~ and 2elgians, but 
also from the Germans themselves who claimed that the politioal 
effects of a oomplete withdrawal "would be to the detriment of 
Germany," and therefore made an "urgent request to the American 
Government not to withdraw."4? Oonsequently~ on June 3 the 
Reich was informed that a token force of one thousand soldiers 
would be left at Ooblenz nfor the time being. n48 Even these 
troops were evacuated about seven months later when French seiz-
ure of the Ruhr became imminent. The American zone was formal-
ly turned over to the Frenoh at n~on on January 27~ 1923.49 
Another factor whioh greatly influenced the return of 
German-American harmony, and one of the most soul-stirring epi-
sodes in the early post-war period, was the extensive aid pro-
vided for the starving German population by the people of the 
United States during 1919 and after. 50 These years were espeo-
" 
1 
ially trying for the Reioh, for when the great conflict finally , 
46 Foreign Relations, 1922, II, 212. 
47 Ibid., 213-216. 
48 ~., 218. 
49 ~., 1923, II, 192-193. 
50 While it is true that most or these prOVisions we~ 
paid for by the Germans, it is doubtful if they would have re-
ceived enough aid to survive nad it not been for the generosity 
of Americans. 
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ended, the food situation there was more than desperate. After ; 
, 
four years of oontinual warfare and of the Allied blookade, 
.. 
meat oonsumption was down to one-seventh of its no~al amount, 
, ; 
fat.s were reduced by t,wo-third-s, and sugar, eggs, potatoes, and 
milk had all but disappeared. 51 As a result, the unbroken mon-
otony of bulky, non-varying, unappetizing food had brought in-
sidious destruction upon the German people and on their morale'; 
The degree of want might be brought out more vividly 
'if the statements are given of several nutritional experts whose 
duty it was to asoertain as ~xaotly as possible the need for 
food in the Reich. The following is a.declaration by Dr. J.E. 
Johannsson, professor of physiology at the Carolinian Institute 
in Stockholm, and the Swedish government's expert on food prob-
lems: 
Signs of demoralization and dissolution of 
sooial bonds can be noticed, but over it all 
the food shortage rules as an almighty factor. 
After all seen and heard during our journey, 
it is the firm conviotion of both of us that 
Germany is in urgent need of supply. through 
import. 52 
In a similar manner, Professor Ernest H. Starling, 
among other things the British delegate to the Allied Food Com-
mission, reported: 
51 Sidney Brooks, Amerioa and GermanI: 1918-1925, 
New York, The Macmillan Company, 1925-;-ro-ii. 
52 ~., 16. 
-
The impression we have received is that the 
nation of Germany 1s broken, both 1n body 
and in spirit. Even, .. if the adverse cond1-
tions as regards food were removed w1tttin 
the next few months, even years of good 
feeding will be necessary before the people 
are to start to he~~th and efficiencY.53 
52 
Finally, Dr. Alonzo E. Taylor, a member of the War 
Trade Board as food expert during the American partiCipation in 
the war, asserted: 
Assuming that Germany bad enough food to go 
to the next harvest on the present ration (which she has not), it would not be wise or 
merciful or just to keep her on that ration 
either for the purpose of saving money for 
herself or any other reason • • • • Under 
all Circumstances, it 1s clear that food 
should be shipped in [to Germany] as needed 
in a correot nutritional program. Raw mater-
ials should be shipped at once, for the re-
pair of domestio depletion • • • • Delay is 
injurious to the Germans and to the Allies •. 
It is the old problem of penology on a na-
tional soale. Shall an offender expiate by 
solitary oonfinement on bread and water or 
work off a fine on the stone pile? Involved 
are both morals and utilities. 54 
It is easy to see, then, that immediate aid to Ger-
many was an urgent necessity, not only in the humanitarian sens 
but for the purpose also of forestal11ng the sucoess of Bolshev-
ism,among the desperate populace. The strength of the Sparta-
cists -- German Bolshevists -- lay muoh in the disoontent pro-
duced by empty bellies, for a Brooks puts it: 
53 Ibid., 14. 
54 ~., 17-19. 
, 
.; 
i 
A small .amount of food ought to be sent to 
Germany without oonditions if it is hoped 
to maintain order there~ otherwise oiro~~ . 
stanoes growing from laok of food will be 
fert11e for the dootrines of Rosa Luxem-
burg and Karl Liebkne6ht of the Spartaous ' 
group who will let ·hell loose if not ourbed. 
There is a frightful ourrent of agitation 
under an app~entlY peaoeful situation. 55
1 
53 
t, The ourrent of agitation spoken of was oertainly true, 
• for street fighting between German oommunists and sooialists 
was a daily ooourrenoe, espeoially in Stuttgart, Dresden~ ~ 
burg, and Berlin, the last of whioh was finally placed under 
martial law in January, 1919. Again, for example, a general 
, 
strike ooourred 1n Leipzig and a demonstration took plaoe in 
Bremen on January 10. Allover Germany orime was r~pant~ rail 
roads lacked engines and fue1~ and industry in general 'sutfered 
from an insuffioiency of metals, ootton, rubber, and ooal. The 
degree of severity was admitted in the Deutsohe Allgemeine ~­
~ on January 13, when a statement was issued to the effect 
that 
[i]mpoverished Germany oan only be recon-
struoted by the labor of all. A very brief 
interval stands between the German nation 
and oomplete qOllapse. 56 
55 ~., 10. Quotes a "neutral relief worker of 
standing." 
56 ~ • 
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These co~dit10ns, then, constituted not only an econ-
om10 menaoe to Europe, but also Germany's jobless~ her unem-
ployable ex-soldiers -- in extr~e need of food and clothing --
ill 
.-presented a serious political and social peril. Yet, there 
was one great nat10n from which might come the wherewithal to 
stem the tide of starvation and to save the day for those who • 
were resisting the Bolsheviks. That nation was the United 
states,5? offioially an enemy oountry, but one to which innum-
erable Germans looked for aid -- probably more earnestly than 
was suspected in this country. A.-reliable observer" is quoted 
by Brooks as saying: 
And again: 
All Germany's hopes today rest on America. . 
The apathy and despondency O~ the people are, 
however, aggravated by the fear (that] the 
Americans will not be able to oarry their 
program through.58 
The mass of people, untrained and inexperienced 
in construotive politiCS, are waiting to be 
told what to do. And they are looking to Amer-
ica to tell them. If they could be assured un-
ambiguously that they would be helped with food 
and raw materials it would suoceed in establishing 
stable government there. It would sound the 
knell of Bolshevism 1n Germany • • • .59 
57 It is sign1fioant to note, however, that American 
aid came completely from non-official souroes. None of the one 
hundred million dollar oongressional appropriation of February, 
1919 was allotted for German relief. 
-
58 Brooks, 24-25. 
59 Ibid. 
55 
The attitude ,then, that aid would be forthcoming 
from the United States was rather prevalent in the Reich, es-
.. 
peoially when America announced her intention to participate 
in solving the problem of pea~e. In fact, Brooks, ~eferring 
to the Versailles Treaty, claims that 
refusal to sign might bave rekindled anti-
German sentiment in the question of what 
America might do for Germany if so disposed 
came in for serious consideration and was 
an important factor in the decision to signe60 
The same author even goes so far as to assert that many of the 
original members eleoted to the new republican government were 
chosen for the1r knowledge of or influenoe in the United 
States. He says: 
How important German, opinion oonsidered the 
possibili ty of aid fr.om America is seen in 
the 1nclusion in praotioally every oabinet 
since that of the first provisional govern-
ment in 1918 of some member aPPOinted be-
cause of some aff1l1at10n, some 1nterests, 
some supposed 1nfluenoe w1th Amer1ca or some 
personal knowledge of Amerioa.Sl 
In support of the above assertion, Brooks points out 
that Herr Matthias Erzberger, German Finance Minister, had di-
rected American propaganda from Germany, and although his know-
ledge of this nation was meagre, the man himself was agreeable 
60 Ibid., 109. 
-
61 Ibid., 113. 
. , 
56 
and knew the valu~'of pub1101tr. S1m11arly~ the first repub-
11can foreign minister, Oount Ulrioh von Brockdorff-Rantzau, 
was experienoed in world affair~, and espeoially familiar with 
.--
America. Count Johann von Bernstorff, too, a man well known 
in the United States, was in charge of the foreign Office Annex I 
relative to peaoe ma~ters, and was doing work with Count Adolf 
• 
Montgelas, who had an Amerioan wife. Finally, Brooks declares 
"upon apparently good authority· that President Ebert himself 
won the eleotion from the National Assembly at Weimar beoause 
of a self-assert10n that he was in a position to secure a large 
loan from Amerioa immediately after the oonolusion of the 
peace.62 
Whether or ~ot t~ese reports are true, it is'hard to 
~:" ~ , :: 
say. Nevertheless, there seems to be enoug~ evidenoe to indi-
oate a real note of expeotanoy in Germany with regard to the 
possibility of Amerioan aid, although off1cials in the United 
\ 
States mayor may not have known this. It i8 oertain, however, 
that the latter were oogn1zant of the general food situation 
among the German p~ople, for in Deoember, 1919, Herbert Hoover, 
head of the Un1ted States Food Administration in Europe, re-
quested the perman government to present him with an aoourate 
62 Ibid., 113-114. 
-
------------------------------------------------~-------------, 
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statement of the nutrit,ional oon41 tion of that country. When 
completed, the survey _howed that cereal produots~in the Reich 
had fallen to sixty-foUr per oent'of the pre-war consumption 
. 
mark, meats stood at a level o~ eighteen per oent, and fats at 
about twelve per oent. As a result, the entire German popu-
lace was close to twenty per cent underweight, and the death 
rate in 1917 had reaohed a figure of nine and one-half per cent 
over that of births.S3 The reliability of these statistics had. 
been carefully oheckedby a special mission sent to Berlin con-
sisting of Dr. AlonzO E. Taylor and Dr. Vernon Kellogg, so that 
their accuraoy oould not be doubted. 
Armed with this information, then, Hoover wrote to 
President Wilson at the Peaoe Oonferenoe: 
Viewing the German Empire from a food point of 
view, there will. be no hope of saving these 
people from starvation if BOlshevist activities 
extend over the empire in a similar manner to 
Russia, with its sequent breakdown in commer-
cial distribution and in the oontrol and dis-
tribution of existing food • • • • We must main-
tain a liquidity of the existing food stooks in 
Germany over the whole Empire, or again the situ-
ation will become almost unsolvable • • • • It 
would appear to me, therefore, that some announoe-
ment with regard to the food policies of Ger-
many is oritioa11y neoessary, and at onoe • • • .64 
63 Frank M. Surfaoe and Raymond L. Bland, American 
Food in the World War and Reconstruotion Period, Stanrord Un1-
verSity,-california;-Stanford U. Press, 1931, 191. This figure 
Was even larger in 1918 ,due to the influenza epidemio. 
64 Brooks, 25-27. 
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Suoh a ,step.was necessary not only beoause the armis-
tice agreement had provided for the oontinuanoe ~n operation 
of the Allied blockade, but also beoause the Food ~dministratio 
was fully prepared tq go into immediate aotio~ in distributing 
supplies. All during the month of November plans had been in 
the prooess of perfeotion for a speedy distribution of food 
materials to Europe, with this organization purohasing one hun-
dred twenty thousand tons of flour and from thirty to forty mil 
lion pounds of pork produots. 65 These were already on their wa 
to Frenoh ports for re-oonsignment or storage. Also, the Unite 
States Grain Corporation had been organized with a oapital of 
one hundred fifty million dollars to oarry out the oommercial 
transaotions for the Food Admini.stration, and was now at hand t 
attend to the immediate shipment of food. Finally, a Paris 
headquarters had been set up whioh was fully prepared to distri 
ute relief "on a scale never before attempted in the history ,of 
war or famine. n66 
Despite these careful preparations, the aotual task 
of provisioning Germany still assumed gigantio proportions, for 
co-operation both from the Allies and the Germans was almost 
negligible. Hoover and his staff were not only faced with the 
65 ~., S. 
66 ~., 6. 
, 
59 
arduous assignment of ,proouring and finanoing tmmense quanti-
) 
ties of food stuffs, but were also saddled with the near im-
.. 
possibilities of either removing or penetrating the Allied 
blockade, and of wresting the· German fleet from its owners to 
he'lp in the great task of transportation. The two latter prob-
lems proved sO diffioult to solve that muoh valuable time was 
consumed where aotion was vitally neoessary. 
The blookade issue originated in November, 1918 when 
Marshal Foob, taking no risks with the Germans, oaused it to be 
plainly stated in the armistioe agreement that the deadly ring 
of vessels around the Reioh was to be maintained "unohanged, 
and [that] all German merohant ships found at sea [were to] re-
main liable to oapture. IIS? Tbese provisions and the intention 
of Amerioa to provide the hungry Germans with food were not 
only oontradiotory, but the maintenanoe of the blookade remaine 
an artifioial barrier restrioting the normal working of eoono.m-
10 laws. The blockade, then, had either to be removed alto-
gether or oo-ordinated in some way with relief and reoonstruot-
ion measures. Complexities showed the latter to be impossible, 
although a somewhat workable 1iason was temporarily effected be 
tween the B100kade Council and the Food Seotion of the Supreme 
67 "Oonditions of an Armistioe with Germany," Amer 
~ Journal 2! International ~, 1919, XIII, 102. 
-
60 
Eoonomio Oounoil. 
The blookade as a whole was fought by Herbert Hoover 
from the very start. ror example. on the first day of January, 
1919, he advised President Wilson that the raising of this ob-
struotion was far more important to the eoonomic reoovery of 
all Europe than was its ma1ntenance in naval and military val. 
ues. He d1d not, however. propose the abandonment of the 
blookade prior to peaoe, but merely urged an open1ng whioh 
would perm1t the passage of certa1nagreed oommodities for 1m-
port and export. He further believed that there should be 
agreed-upon avenues of ored1t~loperations, ohannels of trade and 
oommunioat1on, and tbat:oertain enemy ooean ships should be 
used for transport" serv10e. 68 In addition, both Hoover and 
Lord Robert Oeoil, member of the Br1t1sh Peaoe Oommiss1on, 
thought that Germany should be allowed the opportunity to get 
re-exported food through those neutral nations no~th of her, a 
proposition whioh reoeived no favorable approval from the Su-
preme Council of Supply and Rel1ef. G9 
The problem of neutral oontrol thereupon entered in-
to the general food pioture, for it was "apparent that not only 
was trade between the Reioh and the Allies hampered by the 
68 Brooks, 34. 
69 ~. 
--------------------------------------------------------------_. 
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blockade" but also was , that of the Germans with neutral countries. 
On this pOint Hoover opined to Wilson: 
.. 
We have no justifioation in humanity or poli-
tics in debarring neutrals from buying all the 
food they wish for t-heir oonsumption now that 
we have ample suPPlies.70 
He also addressed the Frenoh, British" and Italian food minis-
ters" Boret" Clynes" and Crespi: 
I am direoted to inquire if you will not re-
oommend to your Governments: 
That all restrictions upon neutral trading be 
at onoe removed in [oertain] commodities. 
That no objeotion be raised by the Allied 
Governments to direot or indireot sale and 
transportation to enemy oountries or to nec-
essary finanoial transaotions involved. 7l 
Hoover's words were in Vain, however, for both the 
Frenoh and the Italian governments perSistently refused to oom-
ply with his pleas. No attempt whatsoever was made to lift the 
blockade before the formal signing of the Versailles Peaoe Trea-
~, although late in April, 1919, permission was given for the 
Germans to import foods on their own aooount. Such trade, never , 
theleas" was still so hampered by a mass of intrioate regula-
tions that Hoover was moved to say: 
We feel • • • from an Amerioan point of view 
that the refusal of the Allies to aooept 
70 Ibid., Hoover to Wilson, January 31, 1919. 
71 Ib1d." ~8. 
-
j 
(the lifting of the blookade] leaves them 
with the total respons1bility for what is 
now impend1ng • • • • We do not believe thet 
blookade was ever an effeotive instrument 
to foroe peaoe; it 1s effeot1ve, however, 
to foroe Bolshevism:72 
as 
The other great task oonneoted with the German nu-
trit10nal s1tuation whioh faoed Amerioa and the Allies in the 
armistioe period was that of seouring from the .Republio what 
• 
remained of the Imperial merohant marine for aid in transport-
, " -
ing food suppl1es to Europe. This was neoessary beoause 1mmed-
1ately after the war a shortage instead of a surplus of ship-
ping existed for transport duty among the Allied nat10ns and 
the l1berated peoples whioh they were supplying. The praotioa-
b1l1ty of us1ng German vessels for such purposes, especially 
sinoe the Reioh was likewise to profit by it, was almost every-
where reoognized. As Oolonel Edward M."House, the intimate 
friend of President Wilson, said: 
at Tr1er 
It would appear to me to be entirely just 
that the enemy shipping in oonsideration of 
relief of enemy territory should be plaoed 
in the general food servioe of all the pop-
ulations released from the enemy yoke as well 
as enemy territorY.73 
Consequently, at tIle Seoond Armistioe Oonvention, hell 
(Trevea) on January 16, 1919, the following provisions " 
---------
72 Ib1d., 41. 
73 Ib1d., 60. 
, 
\', 
were put, into ArtioleVIII of the new surrender agreement: 
In order to insure the food supply of Ger-
many and the rest of Europe, the German~ 
Government will take all neoessary meas-
ures to put the whole German merohant mar-
ine and fleet, for the duration of the ' 
armistioe, under the-oontro1 and under the 
flags of the Allied Powers and of the United 
States who shall be assisted by a German del-
egate •••• This agreement in no wise pre-judices the final disposition of these ships.?4 
63 
The urgency Of the transportation, however, merely • 
led to a oontroversy with certain representatives of the new 
German' Republic. Unaware that the above olause had oome from 
the Amerioans themselves, these individuals feare,d that this 
was merely a scheme by the European Allies to get their hands 
on the German merchant marine. Therefore, they apparently oon-
sidered the possibility of seouring a better bargain with the 
. . 
Allies by playing upon Amerioan sentimentality. At the same 
time, of course, this proved to be an exoellent method of test-
ing the mettle of the United States in its assooiation with its 
comrade nations. 
Thus, for some months no move was made by the Germans 
to turn over their merohant fleet to the A~lles, even though 
such transferenoe had been arranged for at a meeting in Spa, Be 
gium on February 6, 1919. Here Allied de1egat'es under Admiral 
-
74 ~., 59. Tne full text of this agreement is 
printed in "Conventions Prolonging the Armistioe with Germany," 
.~~er1can Journal of International Law, 1919, XIII, 388-392. 
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Sir George Prioe Weble~ Hope and representatives of Germany un~ 
dar Unterstaatssekretar Edler von Braun had oome to an all-
.. 
covering agreement regarding at once the provision of food for 
the Reich, the transfer of German merchant ships for transport-
ation purposes, and seouring of oredits for further purchases 
of needed supplies. All this was now entirely disregarded. 
In the long interim, however, the Germans oontinued to such an 
extent to beg suooor for their oountrymen75 that Admiral Hope 
was foroed to apply the dictum: Bo ships, no food!76 To this 
demand Braun finally aoquiesoed, but continued to hold out for a 
definite agreement whioh would guarantee an adequate supply of 
nourishment for his people before the vessels were surrendered. 
His own words were that he was 
of the opinion that the delivery of the Ger-
man merohant fleet must begin from the moment 
wben reviotualling of Germany with foods was 
secured. 77 
The Unterstaatssekretar emphasized this point by ola~ing that 
the German ration might otherwise have to be c~t, an event whio 
undoubtedly would have grave "political and eoonomio consequen-
ces. n78 
given. 
75 SUrfaoe and Bland, 189-300. Statistical figures 
75 Brooks, 65. 
77 ~. 
78 ~. 
---------------------------------------------------------, 
I' 
65 
On Maroh 5, the German and Allied delegates agreed' 
that 
.. 
subjeot to immediate delivery of the German 
merohant fleet, it is the 1ntent10n of the 
Assooiated Government~ to fa01litate the pro-
vision1ng of Germany from month to month sub-ject to the decision of the Supreme War Coun-
cil as to quantities and cond1tions. 79 
The Weimar government, nevertheless, rejeoted the offer onoe 
more, oontending that it could not 
put the German merohant fleet at the moment 
under oontrol of the Associated governments 
without the food supply of Germany being as-
sured • • • -SO 
Negotiations were thus broken off until late Maroh, 1919, when 
faced with the same naval surrender plus an added burden of de~; 
positing with the Direotor General of Relief suffioient gold 
to oover the value of any food reoeived, the Reioh representa-
tives finally oonoeded defeat and signed away their sh1Ps.Sl 
By this same Brussels Agreement, however, the Germans 
obtained permiss10n to purohase and import three hundred thou-
\ 
t· 
sand tons of breadstuffs and seventy thousand tons of fats~G , 
from Amer10a and the Allies, and any fprther amounts from other 
- 79 Ibid., 67. 
80 Ibid. 
-81 Surfaoe and Bland, 189-200. Cites Supreme Eoon-
omic CounCil, ~ Dooument 128, Appendix II, Paris, 1919. 
82 Ibid., 195. 
ss 
nations for whioh payment oould be made. Reimbursement to the 
first necessarily bad to be made in gold marks, redeemable 
later, and placed in banks of Allied or neutral countries. All 
. 
in all, the amount deposited in such treasuries reached one 
billion, fifty-five million marks (two hundred fifty million 
dollars), slightly less than half of which represented cash 
• 
sales by the American Relief Administration during the Armistice 
period. 83 
As a final word on this matter' of provisioning Germany 
in the years that followed World War I, it might be well to men-
t10n the outstanding services performed by independent welfare 
organizations in the United States, most notable of which was 
the Sooiety of Friends, or Quakers. The latter-mentioned group 
-- under the name of the Amerioan Friends Service Oommittee --
began its humanitarian work soon after the Armistice, but due 
to lack of co-operation from the Allies and to Amerioan pUblio 
84 opinion, they found their task of feeding the Germans a very 
diffioult one. They did not let SUOh previous ill-will deter 
them, however, but rather continued to pursue their labors, 
saying: 
83 ~. 
84 Ibid., 198. 
-
[The] Friends,are not disloyal to their ooun-
try, bu~-they desire ~o be sup~emely loyal to 
the spirit of Jesus Christ who commands us to 
love those whom we oall .' enemies' • 85 .-
67 
In November, 1919 Herb~rt Hoover asked the Friends 
to take on \ the responsibility "of ohild-feeding in Germany. 
Said he: 
Despite the suffering and losses imposed up-
on the Amerioan people through the old Ger-
. man government, I do not believe for a mo-
ment that the real American would have any 
other wish than to see any possible service 
done in protection of child life wherever it 
is in danger. We have never fought with wo-
men and children • • • • I particularly turn 
to you, beoause I am anxious that efforts of 
this kind should not become the subject of 
political propaganda. The undoubted probity, 
ability and American character of the Quakers 
for genera~ions will prevent such use being, 
made for your service, and for this reason I 
propose that the funds at my disposal should . 
be devoted exclusively to your support.~6 
The original mission which answered Mr. Hoover's call 
oonsisted of fifteen volunteers who set out for Germany in Jan-
uary, 1920.87 By the end of February they had started their \ 
merciful work and by July had placed over six hundred thirty-tw 
-
thousand ohildren under their care. A year later these figures 
had risen to almost one million twenty-seven thousand. 88 
85 Brooks, 145. 
86 Ibid., 147. 
87 Later enlarged to forty thousand. Ibid., 154-159. 
88 SUrfaoe and Bland, 198-199. 
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Funds ~or the Friends' work in Germany were oollect-
ed by ~he European Relief Oouncil, formed by Mr.~Hoover in the 
early part of 1920. Among the oontributors were 11sted the 
Fr1ends themselves, the Amer1can Red Cross, the Federal Council 
of Churohes of Ohrist in Amerioa, the Joint Distr1but10n Oom-
m1ttee for Jewish War Sufferers, the Kn1ghts of Columbus, the 
National Catho110 Welfare Council, and both the Young Men's and 
Young Women's Christian Associations. A total of twenty-nine 
m1llion dollars was colleoted for German relief by February, 
1921,89 while another two million was volunteered by the Amer1-
can pub11c through a Food Draft System.90 The German govern-
ment, by means of the Deutsoher Zentralausschuss fUr die Aus-
---~.....-, 
1andsh1lfe, also a1ded this agency by add1ng oons1derable other 
funds,9l by fuxnish1ng free transportation, and by charging no 
tar1ff duty on 1mported food. 
The Friends, after due oonsideration,92 remained in 
the German homeland through 1922, feeding for the most part 
children and expectant mothers, and distributing some 1,400 
bales of clothing wherever it was needed. They f1nished the1r 
89 Brooks, 150. 
90 Ib1d., 163-165. 
91 Two m11lion two hundred 
and Bland, 198-199; Brooks, 154-159. 
92 Brooks, 159-161. 
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work and left the. Reioh that same year, only to return a short 
time later under the direction of Major General Henry T. ,Allen, 
former commander of the American Army of Occupation in Germany. 
This last mission continued its relief work through the harvest 
year of 1923 and 1924. 
In general, then, the saorifioes and contributions of 
the Friends, as well as those of all the other auxiliary orgah-
izations, might well be considered as integral parts, of those 
relations which conoerned the German and American peoples in 
the trying years of the post-war era. The value of suoh inter-
relations in renewing friendly ties between the United States 
and the Reich cannot, of oourse, be acourately measured, but 
from the expressions of gratitude which came from persons of 
prominenae in Germany, the influenoe in this regard must have 
been oonsiderable indeed. Thus, as Herman MUller, ohanoellor at 
the time the Friends left Europe, put it: 
-
I wish ••• ,to express to the distributors 
of this relief, as well as to all those in 
the United states who have oontributed in 
the oolleotion of funds, how fully the Ger-
man people appreoiate this work of brother-
ly love. • • • For the oontinuation of this 
relief, which has been made possible by the 
co-operation of so many olasses of the Amer-
ican population and which is being carried 
forward in the spirit of true justioe and a 
brotherly love and a goodness knowing no 
boundaries, I wish a rich blessing.93 
93 Ibid., 176-177. 
-
, 
And again, Dr. JO,seph 'Wirth, the German Ohancellor in 1921, 
wrote: .. 
Any form of government'may continue if it 
can offer to the people the most necessary 
means of existence..- In this respect child 
feeding has greatly helped our present 
government •••• It is not too much to say 
that all such work has helped, in a way to 
prevent within the mass of the German people 
a still greater growth of despondency. In 
this respect the Ohild feeding operation has 
decidedly counteracted the spread of BOlshev-
ism. • • • [The share of all Americans] in 
this work has given room to hope that this 
memorable aotion of oharity may soon be fol-
lowed by co-operation along economic lines 
between the United States and Germany •••• 
The never-to-be-forgotten merit of the Amer-
ioan benefaotors consists in oreating in the 
German people a mental tranquillity and in 
reduoing their feeling of being forsaken by 
the whole world.94 
70 
In summary, then, dur ing the early years after World • 
War I, the antagonistic attitudes left as a residue from that 
gigant10 struggle were slowly being replaced by a new and more 
friendly outlook. The Allied-Amer1oan break, the 1nfamy of Ver 
, 
sailles, the Rhineland Oooupat10n, and above all, the great 
gesture of meroy shown by private citizens 1n providing food fo 
a starVing German populace -- all these served to show that, un 
offioially at least, the two peoples were well on their way to-
ward a fruitful era of peaoe and harmony. How this same trans-
94 Ibid., 177-178. 
, 
,-
71 
formation was oarr,ied out along lines of diplomaoy and oommeroe 
will be the subjeot of Ohapter III. .. 
.' 
.-
OHAPTER III 
" 
.. -OFFIOIAL PEACE AND BETTER BUSINESS 
The gradual rapprochement, whioh in the previous cha 
ter was shown to have developed between the peoples of German~ 
and the United States shortly after the First World War, did no 
immediately become reflected in the offioial relations of those 
countries. While for all praotical purposes a true peace had 
been effected between these nations at the Armistice convention 
of late 1918, no suoh status was recognized by the respective 
governments concerned. As a matter of official record, a form-
al state of war still existed between the two powers as long as 
no definitive peace treaty was conoluded by them, or no act of 
Congress was made to repeal the declaration of hostilities 
framed in April, 1917. 
Americans and oitizens of the German Reioh, then, re-
mained teohnical enemies long after the Armistioe, and thus no 
early attempt was made to re-establish those diplomatio ties 
which had formerly existed between them. In fact, the matter 
VIas totally ignored for almost a full year after the cessation 
of military action. It had, indeed, been inadvisable up to 
this time for the United States to send a representative into 
72 
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the Reich to handle its affairs, not only beoause there still 
was hope that the Senate might aooept the TreatYwof Versailles, 
but also beoause no suoh preoedent had been set by any of the 
other Allied powers. 
When, in Ootober, 1919, no ratifioation of the Ver-
sailles paot seemed even remotely probable, a representative of 
the Commission to Negotiate the Peaoe wrote from Paris to Sed-
retary of state: 
Owing to the great dependenoe of Germany 
on the United States for its neoessities, pre-
sent and future, and to the faot that we are 
still more trusted in Germany than any other 
nation, we are in a position readily to es-
tablish pOints or [oontaot] whioh will aid 
in the rehabilitation of Germany and indireot-
ly in that of the whole of Europe_ l 
. 
He further noted that, while the appointment of a oharge or a 
diplomatio agent might stlll be impraotioable, it might be well 
to name a oommissioner who would prove most valuable in support-
ing and enoouraging the new German government, in observir.g the 
the politioal, finanoial, and eoonomio situation in the Reich, 
and in oontrolling and reporting the aotivitles of oommeroial 
2 
travelers in Germany. 
1 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 242. 
2 ~_ 
, 
'j 
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Sinoe seleotion of suoh a commissioner had to be made 
with a 'great deal of care, a whole week passed before Secretary 
of state Lansing wrote baok to the Peace Oommission: 
.--
I cannot think of anyone in the service more 
suitable to act for. usili t.his capaoi ty than 
Ellis (Loring] Dresel.3 
Dresel was an experienced diplomatist who had been an agent of 
• 
the state Department in Germany before the war,4 and was in Par-
is on duty at the peace conferenoe. Thus, upon Lansing's recom-
mendation, he was instructed on November 5 to proceed to Berlin 
under the title of Amer10an Oomm1ss10ner. In th1s capaoity he 
was not to be oons1dered a "diplomatio officer accorded to Ger-
many," but was merely to reoe1ve 1nformat10n of 1nterest and im-
portance on oondit10n and op1nions of the German state, and to 
ascertain as far as possible the aspirations of foreign govern-
ments in the new republio. 5 
The time of Dresel's arr1val in the German oapital,wa 
later changed so as not to be misoonstrued by the Allies or ap-
pear to be a lone-handed move by the United States. As a safe-
guard, it was planned that he should not start for the Reich be 
fore the signing of a protoool reaff1rm1ng Germany's peace obli 
3 ~., 243. 
1922, 
4 Who's Who in Amerioa, Ohioago, A.N. Marquis and Co. 
XIII,964. ------
5 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 244. 
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gations, 6 for an ,earlier arrival might enoourage the Germans in 
what was feared to be their polioy of "driving a--wedge between 
the Allies."? However, as the year progressed, the need for 
Dresel became so acute that he was finally dispatched from Paris 
to Berlin on January 14, 1920, and arrived there to take up his 
duties three days later. Here he remained for almost two years 
• 
in the capacity of commissioner, oontinuing to handle American 
affairs in the interim period before formal diplomatio relations 
were restored between the United States and Germany in 1921. 
In November of that year his status was ohanged to that of 
charge d' affaires,8 a post whioh he retained until relieved by 
., 
Alanson B. Houghton, appointed Ambassador to the Reioh in April, 
1922.9 
Negotiations for a formal peace between the American 
and German governments, apart from that established by the Trea-
ty of Versailles, were initiated as early as Deoember 20, 1919. 
Thus, even while the Paris pact was still being bantered about 
in the Senate, that august group had already heard Senator Phil-
ander O. Knox of Pennsylvania submit a resolution deolaring 
1920. 
6 Protoool to the Treaty of Peaoe, signed January 10, 
Foreign Relations, Paris Peaoe Oonferenoe, XIII, 743-754. 
7 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 245. 
8 Ibid., 1921, 3~ 
9 Who's Who ~ Amerioa, XII, 1678. 
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"That peace exists between the United States and Germany.nlO No 
action was 'taken on this proposal, however, until the following 
~ ~ 
May when it was amended, passed by both houses of Congress, and 
sent to President \Vilson for. -his signature. The Chief Execu-
tive, ill and still smarting'from his Versailles defeat, vetoed 
the bill, so that it was returned to Congress, where less than 
the necessary two-thirds vote failed to make it law. ll 
Little more was heard of the separate peace with Ger-
many until April 12, 1921, when;the new President, Warren G. 
Harding, addressed the SixtY-Seventh Congress in these words: 
The United States alone among the allied and 
the assooiated powers ,oontinues ina technic-
al state of war ,against the Central Powers of 
Europe. This anomalous condition ought not 
to be permitted to oontinue. To establish' 
the state of teohnioal peaoe without fUrther 
delay, I should approve a deolaratory resolu-
tion by Congress to that effect, with the qual-
ifioations essential to protect all our rights. 
Such action would be the simplest keeping of 
faith with ourselves, and could in no sense be 
construed as a desertion of those with whom we 
shared our saorifices in war, for these powers 
are already at peaoe.12 
Aocordingly, Senator Knox introduoed his 1920 resolution once 
again, and after some debate and amendment, it was approved on 
July 1 by both the House of Representatives and the Senate. 
10 Senate Resolution 136, 66th Congress, 2nd Session. 
':longressiona~ Record, Deoember 20, 1919, 960. 
11 Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, X!!!, l~ 
12 ill!!. J 
'-
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True to h1s word,. the' President set his name to the b1ll one 
day later, t,hus mak1ng 1 t law.13 .. 
Commissioner Dresel at Berlin reoeived the announoe-
. 
ment on July 5. At the same-""time, however, he was requested 
to ask an "authoritative and def1nite answer n14 as to whether 
the German government wished to objeot to or quest10n any of the 
rights aooruing to the United states in oertain seotions15 of 
the Versailles Treaty, for these provis1ons would undoubtedly 
be oontained in suoh a peaoe treaty as had been 1n the prooess 
of d1soussion between the Reioh and Amer10a sinoe the previous 
January. The reply arrived about two weeks later, when the 
Secretary of state reoeived word that the deoision of the 
Re1ohskab1nett "fully oorrespond[ed] with the views of the 
Amerioan Government. nlS 
As a result of this agreement, then, negotiations were 
further oarried on between the two governments whioh oulminated 
on August 25, 1921 in the signing in Berlin of the treaty 
bet"een the United states and Germany restor1ng friendly 
relat1ons. 17 
13 fbial~7. Text of resolut1on on pages 18 and 19. 
14 Fore1gn Relations, 1921, II, S. 
15 Ibid., 5. Seotions are l1sted. 
16 Ibi~., 7. 
17 Ibid., 29-33. Full text given. 
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BY Artiole I of this instrument, the Weimar government under-
took to aooord to the United States: 
all the rights, priv~leges, indemnities, re-
parations or advantages speoified in the • • • 
Joint Resolution of the Congress • • • of July 
2, 1921, inoluding all the rights and advan-
tages stipulated for the benefit of the United 
States in the Treaty of Versailles which the 
United States shall fully enjoy notwithstand-
ing the fact that such Treaty has not been rat-
ified,by the United Statese18 
By this treaty# then, and by the resolution of July 2, 
peaoe between the German and Amerioan nations was onoe more of-
fioially restored. It will be noted, however, that it was a 
completely one-sided peaoe and one in wh10h the very essenoe of 
Amerioa's post-war philosophy -- that of esoaping from inter-
national obligations -- was boldly and fully set forth. What-
ever r1ghts the Un1ted States was to reoeive from the Versailles 
dooument, that is, the retent10n until further adjustment of 
seized German property# joint title with the other powers to 
the former German overseas possessions, suoh finanoial deta1ls 
as payment for oooupying troops# and many other privileges --
these were retained. But the duties, above all of secur1ng the 
peace through oo-operation with the League of Nations -- these 
were rejeoted. America was 1ndeed partaking of the fruits of 
peaoe, but was not giv1ng anyth1ng to seoure them for the future 
18 Ib1d. 
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As might be 'expeoted, the separate peace with the 
Reich was met wi. th widely varying degrees of publ1.c approval 
both in this country and in Teu1;onic Europe. Even before Con-
.. -gressional action was taken on the Knox resolutions, the at-
titude of the Democratic elements, which saw in this plan an 
abandonment of the Allies, was being countered with such state-
ments as: 
and 
A separate peaoe, coming • • • after the baf-
fling complications caused by the deadlock 
between the.President and Senate, could not, 
except in the language of campa1gn bunoombe, 
be oharacterized as a gross act of treason to 
the nation's allies. 
[I]t was not the purpose of the Republican Ad-
ministration advocates of the Knox resolution 
to embark on any projeot of separate peace with 
a view to leaving the Allies in the lurch. 19 
It was nevertheless agreed by ,the advocates of the 
treaty that: 
there is always grave danger ••• that a separate, 
peaoe would further weaken those relations with 
our allies which • • • had already been weakened 
to a deplorable degree. Against this danger it 
is peculiarly necessary to guard in view of Ger-
many's persistent endeavor to esoape her obliga-
tions under the Treaty of Versailles.zO 
19 "Make the Separate Peaoe Harmless," wee~~ Revie]!, 
New York, National Weekly Corporation, IV, April l~l . 1, ~30. 
20 llli. 
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As a remedy for this~ the suggest10n -- not ent1rely heeded --
was made to .. 
1ncorporate into the resolution a deolara-
t10n which • • • should embody [a note 
plac1ng] upon Germany the respons1b111ty 
for the war, and the ob11gation to make re-
paration to the full extent of her ability. 
• • • An aff1rmation [also] of our support 
of the finality of the settlement at Ver-
sa1l1es ••• would be of infinite value in 
the present situation in Europe'2l 
The controversy in the American press continued long 
after the treaty was completed. Pro-leaguers were prone to ex-
claim with the Pittsburgh Post: 
Did we send two million men aoross the sea 
for a peaoe treaty that would omit any re-
ference to the principles for whioh we 
fought?22 . 
In this same va1n, the Memphis Commeroial Appeal remarked that 
the silence of the treaty on the oauses of the war and on Ger-
~ many's conduot was "apologetio, shifty, and pusillanimous." .., 
Finally, oharging that the agreement aided the Germans to split 
the Allies, the New York World saroastically noted: 
German diplomaoy for the last two years has 
recognized only one aim, which is the nulli-
fication of the Treaty of Versailles •••• 
For all the practical purposes of Berlin the 
21 Ibid. 
-22 II A Peace of Distang1ement," Literary Digest, LXX, 
September 10, 1921, 12. 
23 Ibid. 
-
first ~edge'has been driven into the Treaty 
of Versailles, and the business of wrecking 
it oan be oarried on as prudenoe and oppor-
tunity dictate.24 
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On the other hand, the St. Paul Dispatoh saw a boon 
.-
to Amerioan nationalism in the paot, for it oonsidered it to be 
the ooup ~ grace to the supergovernment whioh 
would have set its foot upon the oonstitution-
al self-sovereignty of the United States and 
the ratification of the treaty will be the first • 
positive expression of our government to replace 
the several negative evidences of our attitude 
toward the surrender of sovereignty to an inter-
national assooiation.aS 
Likewise, the New York Tribune thought that "a separate peaoe 
whioh suits us [is] better than a joint peaoe whioh would have 
tied us up to an unworkable League of Nations Covenant. n2S 
And lastly, Republioan Senators Medill MoCormiok of Illinois an 
Porter J. McCUmber of North Dakota appealed to Amer1ca's good 
fortune in negotiating suoh a paot by saying, respeotively: 
and 
The treaty epitomizes the return to sensible 
American diplomaoy and normal, national, real-
izable ideals. Under it Amerioa, true to her 
tradition, assumes no politioal obligation in 
Europe. Her economic rights are everywhere 
safeguarded. 27 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
I am very favorably .1mpressed with the treaty, 
espeoially the provisions whioh reserve our 
rights under the Versailles Treaty, whioh Ger-
many has ratified without our having to ratify 
it ourselves or without our having to be bound 
by it.a8 · 
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The attitude towar"d the state Department in general, 
and more speoifioally State Seoretary Oharles E. Hughes who ne-
gotiated the treaty, was likewise divided. A word of pr~ise for 
• 
both was uttered by the Weekll Review when it opined: 
[T]he impression is very real that our State 
Department is again operating in ways that 
the plain Amerioan oan reasily understand and 
approve. 
and 
Mr. Wilson -- despite his ••• ideals ••• 
retarded the progress of the world enormously. 
Amerioans are • • • beginning to appreoiate 
what a magnifioent reoord this oountry might 
have made for itself at the [Peaoe Oonferenoe] 
if someone of Mr. Hughes's talent and oommon 
sense had been our plenipotentiary at Paris. 29 
The ~ Republio, nevertheless, dubbed the Department's work as 
"an affair of shears and paste pot," while the Indianapolis News 
\ 
predioted that it would be "ratified with a feeling of relief, 
but oertainly not with a feeling of pride."30 
28 "Peaoe with Germany," New Republio, New York, Re-
publio Publishing Co., XXVIII, September 7, 19~1, 30. 
29 "The German Treaty," Weekly Review, V, September 
3, 1921, 201-202. 
30 "Peaoe with Germany," New Republio, 30; "The Peaoe 
'With Germany," Current Opinion, New York, Uurrent Literature 
Publishing Co., LXXX, Ootober, 1921, 413. 
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On the other side of the Atlantio in Germany, almost 
equally separated extremes of viewpoints were e~ressed, al-
though for different reasons. Business interests in general re 
joioedat the thought of the~oommeroial opportunities whioh 
would aoorue to them with the newly deolared state of peaoe. 
For example, a "German government offioial" was quoted as say-
ing: 
Business will be benefited immediately. Under 
the teohnioal state of war whioh existed busi-
nessmen hesitated to engage in oontraots with 
alien enemies. There was nothing agreed rela-
tive to oommeroial treaties, nor the personnel 
of the German mission sent to the United States, 
but [now] we will send our ablest men.3l 
Similarly, Vorwarts agreed that 
The continuance of a formal state of war very 
seriously hampered Germany's eoonomio reoon-
struction. For this reason alone the signing 
of the treaty is an event of the utmost joy-
ous import for GermanY-33 
Opinions oonflicted rather strongly, however, in re-
gard to the benefits of the Berlin Paot over that of Versailles. 
\ 
One view maintained by the Deutsohe Allgemeine Zeitung speoif-
ioally favored its om'ission of "a whole series of oppressive 
oonditions."33 Too, some Germans saw in the Amerioan treaty a 
31 "The Peaoe that Germany Won," Literary Digest, 
LXX, September 10, 1921, 18. 
32 Ibid_ 
33 Ibid. 
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veritable blow at the' Paris Diktat, while others, taking a mid-
dle position, asserted: .. 
The United states makes numerous reservations 
and insists upon the ·advantages • • • of the 
Treaty of Versailles, but we [the Germans] will 
continue to act frankly upon the supposition 
that, although insisting upon 100 per cent of 
that Versailles Treaty, the United States pro-
bably will demand the actual execution of less 
than 50 per cent of, the Treaty's provisions. 34 • 
Finally, the more radical element v.io1ently opposed 
the paot. This group was probably well represented by the writ 
ings of Dr. Bernhard Dernb~rg in the Berliner Tageb1att which 
veritably charged :"We [the Germans] have swallowed the devil 
whole without cons1dering the m1xture we have drunk." Dernburg 
called the treaty "v1rtually a repet1tion of the Versa111es vio 
lenoe, ft 35 and'charaoter1zed America's att1tude of aloofness to-
ward the terr1tor1al adjustment of Europe as a oontradiotion of 
her demand for equal privileges 1n mandate territory which was 
~6 dictated solely by Amer10an 011 1nterests. 
The f1nal l1nk 1n the cha1n of off101al Amer10an 
friendsh1p for the German nat10n was forged 1n m1d-l922, when 
ambassadors from both powers were respectively exohanged. Dr. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid.; "Peaoe with Amer1ca," The Living Age, 8th 
Series, XXIV, October 15, 1921, 147-149. 
36 Ibid. 
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otto L. Wiedfeldt arrived in the United States on May 13, 1922. 
He was preceded in Germany by the Amerioan envoy,~Alanson B. 
Houghton, a wealthy glass manufacturer who had gained part of 
"0 
his education there and had served in Congress from the State of 
New York. Houghton sailed in early April, having in mind, as he 
said, the former years of "peace and friendship which bound the 
American and German peoples, rather than the few years of war' 
and misunderstanding which [had recently] separated them."~7 Al-
though he was denounced by certain American Legion posts for his 
light interpretation of "misunderstanding," he nevertheless re-
affirmed his peaceful intentions, remarking: 
First and foremost, I do not believe in the 
moral or spiritual or even economic value of 
~ate. Hate serves no useful purpose. It is 
far more dangerous to those who hate than to-
those who are hated. It leads only to con-
fusion and destruotion. The war is ended. 
The loser, to his ability, must foot the bill. 
But its causes, the apportionment of blame or 
guilt, are matters Whioh, frankly, I for one 
will no longer discuss.38 
His attitude was praised by the New York Evening ~, 
whioh called him "right in refusing to enter upon his mission 
with a hymn of hate upon his liPs.,,39 This news-sheet refraine 
37 IITies with Germany Renewed," Literarx plgest, 
LXXIII, April 15, 1922, 14. 
38 1l?!9:.. 
39 Ibid. 
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from emotionalism,. however, by adding:, 
(Yet,] if there are any Germans 1n this~coun­
try ••• who hope that this means a repudia-
tion of the principles for which we sent a 
million men to fight. ' •• , they will sooh be 
disillusioned. Any/such attitude is as hos-
tile to friendly relations between the United 
States and Germany as is [that] of those who 
criticise Mr. Houghton for being too concil-
iatory. There can be no upsetting of the re-
sults of the war. Nor will either country 
lose anything by realizing that their renewed • 
association will benefit not only themselves, 
but also the entire family of nations. 40 
Finally, both the Philadelphia Public Ledger and the New York 
World, referring to Mr. Houghton's appointment, set the stage 
for real German-Amerioan co-operation when they voiced, respect 
1vely: 
and 
It is about time that the world cleared its 
mind of the remnants of some of the more 
reckless war propaganda, and remembered that' 
there are women and Children in Germany and 
a new generation, and that something must be 
left of that vast liberal element that would 
have set up a real democratic government in 
Germany within a few years if it hadn't been 
deliberately overwhelmed and martyred in the 
war. 
Peace with Germany has been restored; the time 
is past for fanning old passions as the best 
proof of' patriotism. It is no disloyalty at 
this day to practise common sense and observe 
the ordinary rules of courtesY.41 
Formal peace, then, was finally effected between the 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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United states and. Germany in 1921. YetI the three years which 
intervened s1noe the armistioe had not been enti~ely neglected 
as far as relations between the two peoples were concerned. 
This was espeoially true in the field of international commerce, 
the flow of which was resumed less than a year after the im-
perial surrender. Since such was the case, it might be well to 
consider this early trade before gOing on to that which deve1~ 
oped after the Treaty of Berlin. 
. 
Correspondenoe regarding the renewal of commercial re-
lations with the Reich originated towards the end of June, 1919 
between the Department of State and members of the Commission t 
Negotiate the Peaoe, but serious disoussion of the question did 
not'begin until after conolusion of the Treaty of Versail1es. 42 
By this time, there was already oonsiderable oonoern over the 
added advantages whioh foreign nations, inoluding the top Allie , 
might obtain if Amerioan oommeroe with the Reioh were not quick 
ly renewed, but at the same time it was not known for certain 
\ 
whether suoh ties could be set up before ratification of the 
treaty by the Senate. This latter doubt was caused by a stipu-
lation in the paris agreement itself which required ratificatio 
by Germany, by three chlef allied powers, and by the oountry 
42 ~oreign Relations, 1919, II, 234. 
sa 
wishing to trade with the new republio before suoh commeroial 
bonds oould be re~umed.43 
.. 
In the main, the Peaoe Oommissioners were muoh less 
perturbed by the situation than was the State Department. This 
.,~-
was natural beoause the latter, pressed for "definite informa-
tion as to when and by what means trade relations with Germany 
[could] be established,"44 feared that postponement would givf1 
the impression that it was the administration's object thereby 
to influenoe the Senate's aotion on ratifioation. It must have 
come as a great relief to those in the Department, ~herefore, t 
learn that on June 26 the Counoil of Allied and Associated Pow-
era agreed to raise the blookade around Germany as soon as the 
Rei~h alone bad indors~d the treaty.45 
This last-mentioned oondition was fulfilled On July 1 
1919 when the Versailles Paot was finally ratified by the Germ 
home government. Aooordingly, on July 12 trade relations with 
that country were offioially sanotioned by the War Trade Board 
\ 
of the Department of State, and all patents, oommeroial marks, 
and oopyrights were made valid. Persons in the United States 
43 "Tra.ding with Germany Again," Current History, 
Rew York, The New York Times Publishing 00., X, Pt. 2, 4~2. 
44 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 234. Tnis situation 
also prevailed in the bepartment of Commeroe. Reports 01' the 
pepartment o~ Commerce: 1919, Washington, D.C., U:S. Government 
~rinting Office, l~ 2~ 
45 "Trading with Germany Again,lI Current History, 432 
r 
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were allowed now to trade. and communicate with persons resid-
ing in Germany, subject, however, to limitations on dyes, dye-
stuffs, potash, drugs, and chemicals produced in the Reich. In 
this last regard, the Secretary of State informed the Peace Com 
.' -
mission that America was not 
restricting Germany's general freedom to trade 
in dyes, [etc.], but merely controlling their 
import into the United States for purely dom-
estic reasons.4S 
The immediate effects of this commercial resumption 
for American and German merchants was a rush to negotiate what-
ever business transactions they could possibly make. To cite 
just a few instances of what occurred, it might be said that 
less than a week after the blockade withdrawal the Deutsche 
~, the largest private such institution in Germany, was al-
ready negotiating with several New York banks for re-establish-
ment of German credits concerning interests in the United State 
Again, by July 18 the United States Shipping Board had already 
allocated ten cargo vessels for trade with Germany.48 Likew~se, 
trade relations with American concerns at Coblenz was soon "pro 
gressing rapidly," and it was reported that several important 
Itdeals ll were being consummated. 49 Finally, the American Review 
46 Foreign Relatione, 1919, II, 239. 
47 II Trading with Germany Again," Current History, 43:". 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
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of Reviews published a note in Deoember, 1919, to the effeot 
- . 
that: .. 
An organization for the enoouragement of trade 
with the United State~, too, is in rapid pro-
gress of formation._ One important seotion of 
it will deal with ootton, in conneotion with 
which the German papers of September [1919] re-
port an elaborate scheme :f"or the setting up of 
a new Cotton Trade Bank. 50 
In oontrast to some of the other European powers, ~ow 
ever, American interests found themselves at several distinct 
disadvantages when it oame to the aotual proourement of busines 
in Germany. In the first plaoe, the American government contin 
ued to restriot the issuanoe of passports for oommeroial repre-
sentatives to enter that oountry, and thus the only avenue open 
to them was through neutral nations. This defeot was remedied 
after July 22, but before that it proved to be an annoying and 
often harmful bar to trade. 
Seoondly, the United States oompletely laoked a suf'fi 
cient number of oonsuls in German oities to allow the olearance 
\ 
Of vessels headed home with oargoes. Beoause of this deficien-
cy, Herbert Hoover at one time took it upon himself to olear tw 
ships at Hamburg, although he had no authority whatsoever to do 
so. The Commission to Negotiate the Peace, instead of urging 
50 IIpublic Opinion in Germany," The American Review 
of Reviews, New York, Review of Reviews 00., December, l~-~ 
6~5. 
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rectification of ,this'trouble, was rather of the opinion that: 
a few weeks' postponement of opening trade ~ 
relations, even if other countries thereby ~ 
obtain a slight • • • advantage, can hard-
ly have permanent c,onsequences. 51 
Yet, the State Department believed that 
if the Allies can send consular or commercial 
representatives into Germany, even if only for 
a few weeks, the advantages gained would be 
great· 52 
On July 18, 1919, therefore, this same source announc 
that it was "considering" sending consuls to German Cities, al-
though such appointment,s were not consummated until the follow-
ing November 4. John Q. Wood, Emil Saur, and Francis R. stew-
art were then dispatched to Coblenz, not, indeed, to perform or 
dinary consular functions, but simply to be in charge of neces-
sary protection for American trade interests, and to supply in-
formation to the State Department and to businessmen in gener-
1 53 a • 
This last-mentioned service was greatly improved two 
years later when the Bureau of Foreign and Domestio Commerce, 
a branch of the United States Commerce Department, opened an of 
fice in Berlin proper. Here, under the able guidance of Howard 
w. Adams and later Charles E. Herring, tremendous amounts of ai 
51 Foreign Relations, 1919, II, 234. 
52 ~., 235. 
53 Ibid., 243-244. 
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were given to American merohants and their foreign agents to 
promote business and to looate purohase souroes ~d sales mar-
kets. Investigati,ons, for instanoe, were made into the German 
optioal industry, into new German metallurgioal prooesses, in-
to the shipping situation, and into various other fields like 
that of sugar, automobiles, and vegetable fiber industries in 
the Reioh. Monthly surveys were also prepared on subjeots like 
those of "Ourrenoy, Depreoiation and Prioe Inoreases, II liThe In-
ternal Value of the Mark," and others oompleted in 1922. Final 
ly, the offioe at Berlin, whioh oontinued at least through 1925 
to 'establish oonneotions for exporters and to produce surveys 
of market possibilities and methods, was joined by a branch 
headquarters at Hamburg, so that even more advantageous trado 
could be oarried on with the Germans. 54 
In turning now to a consideration of the actual resul s 
of German-Amerioan business in the post-war deoade, it might be 
well to pay attention at first to the period from 1919 to 1923. 
'l'hese years represented an era of gradually mounting inflation 
in the Reioh, and therefore constituted a period of crisis, as 
it were, not only for German commerce with the United States, 
but also with the entire world. Whether or not these condition 
54 Ninth to Thirteenth Annual Reports of the Secret-
p.ry of Commerce: 192r--l~-;nr,-\Vashington, D.O., Us Government 
Printing Office, 1921-1925, 54, 115, 122, 86-87, 90-91, respec-
tively • 
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were at all expeQted cannot be fully determined, but there is 
evidence to show that in 1919 merchants in gener.al tended to 
be rather cautious in their attitude. In this country the real-' 
. 
ization was rather widespread, first of all, that a new basis 
for trade with Germany -- both in finance and in good will --
had first to be built up, and that, secondly, a lack of suff1c-
ient shipping would still exist for a long while. • Thus, as 
President Alfred E. Marling of the New York Chamber of Commerce 
rather facet10usly put it: 
[W]omen are specially strong in [anti-German] 
prejudice, and if women will not buy goods, 
what's the use of the merchants buying?55 
The New York Tribune, too, painted a somewhat gloomy 
post-war commercial pioture by predicting a period of at least 
five years before German trading power could equal the five-hun 
dred million dollar mark which had been set as an all-time, high 
in 1913. In fact, this newspaper went so far as to say that 
only about twenty per oent of this figure could be reached be-
\ 
tore 1925.56 
Nor was there any great optimism over American busi-
ness among merchants and manufaoturers in Germany. In fact, 
55 "Resuming Trade with Germany," 'Li terary, Digest, 
LXII, July 26, 1919, 12. Quotes the New York Journal of ~­
merce. 
56 Ib1d., 13. 
these men looked more .to an exohange of goods over their east-
\ 
ern land borders than to trans-ooeanio trade,57 for they fully 
,. 
realized the impoverishment of their war-torn oountry. No mer-
. 
ohant fleet, no oolonies, no~ indeed any settled exohange .faoil-
ities were available to the Reich, and therefore, it was thought 
that little could be expeoted in the way of trade with the Uni-
ted States.' 
Surprisingly enough, the estimates of both these par-
ties proved quite inoorrect, for within a year after the block-
ade had been removed Americans and Germans were again doing bus 
ness on an unexpeotedly high soale. Record-breaking exports 
were made to Germany of Amerioan pork, beef, and other meat and 
dairy produots, primarily beoause of the nu.trit1onal oondition 
within the Reioh. Inadd1tion; cotton and leaf-tobaooo made up 
the bulk of suoh German imports for that year, while large pur-
ohases of ohemioals, fertilizers, furs, sugar-beet seed, and 
chinaware oaused Amerioan figures to rise from a monthly rate 0 
approximately two hundred ninety thousand dollars in July to 
over three million two hundred thousand dollars in November. 
The totals for the completed fiscal year showed that Germany ha 
had almost a ninety-three million dollar import trade with the 
57 Herbert T. Wade, ed., The New International Year 
Book: 1919, New York, Dodd, Meade an~o~1920, 288-29~. ----
.. 
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United States" while sales to Americans reached slightly Over 
ten and one-half million dollars. 58 
,'" 
It would seem" then, that German foreign trade with 
America was considered by people in trre fatherland to be worthy 
of an all-out effort at re-establishment. This is especially 
apparent when the difference between post- and pre-war values 
are given consideration" for even though the new totals may see 
insignificant in comparison with pre-war trade, the gain shown 
above is truly remarkable a feat, having been performed in the 
face of national exhaustion" urgent need for food, and a rapid-
ly depreciating currency. 
The remaining two years of German inflation were char 
acterized by even more spectacular development in commercial 
relations between the two countries. For instance" a' figure 
nearing four hundred million dollars expressed the total sales 
and purchases made by these peoples in 1920 and 1921. 09 When 
placed along side that of 1913,,60 a banner year for German-Amer 
lcan trade" it repres~nts a veritable comeback to almost threc-
fourths of the pre-war zenith. It is to be noted, of course, 
that these later statistics represent a much lower quantity of 
58 Ibid. 
59 itA Great and Growing American Tl'ade with Germany, I 
Curren~ QElnion, New York, Current Literature Publishing Co., 
LXX, March, 1921" 402-403. 
60 $533,000,,000. 
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goods than in the last pre-war year because prices on most 
materials and finished products had risen to hi~her levels dur-
ing the intervening time. Finally, it might be added that, of 
all the Reichls former enemies, the United States was the only 
nation to reach so closely its 1913 commercial peak at this 
early date. Such a result was no doubt due to the higher pur-
chasing power of the American dollar as compared to the less. 
stable currencies of other countries. 61 
During 1922 and 1923, the boom of the two previous 
years was slightly deflated, apparently because the Germans wer 
unable to deliver goods according to the terms of their con-
tracts. These years witnessed a rapid fall in the value of the 
mark in that country, and there followed as a conseq~ence a 
rising scale of wage payments. Nevertheless, the total of Ger-
man imports from the United States for the earlier year mount-
ed to almost forty-six million metric tons, while the Reich ex-
ported slightly half that amount to American ports. In 1923, 
after buying was stimulated by the introduction of the Renten-
mark, German merohants were able to send an amount of products 
worth thirty-eight per cent over that of the previous year, or 
a sum of $161,347,000. Of all the nations then supplying Ger-
61 Wade, New InternEttional Year Book: 1921, 278. 
- --
many, the United States ranked first; as a oustomer it OOCUl-
seventh Plaoe. 62 
... 
Toward the end of 1923 'a new era began for German-
Amerioan trade, primarily beQause of the stabilization of the 
mark within the Reioh. This establishment of a sounder finan-
cial foundation oreated a renewed oonfidenoe among merohants of 
both nations, the ultimate result of whioh was the negotiation 
of a definitive commeroial treaty be'tween America and Getmany 
in December of that year. The roots of this agreement lay, 
first of all, in the adoption by the United States a year ear-
lier of a tariff policy of equal treatment,63 and secondly, in 
the German obligation under the Treaty of Versailles to accord 
most-favored-nation treatment to the Allied and Associated Pow-
ers for a period of five years. 64 The time was ripe, therefore, 
to consider just such a paot as this. 
Officially known as a Treaty Regarding Friendship, 
Commeroe and Consular Rignts,65 the understanding reaohed on De 
cember 8, 1923 represented a "careful revision of American in-
struments in the light of modern conditions and recent exper-
ience." 66 Above all, it settled all the tldiplomatio skirmishes 
549. 
62 Ibid., 1923, 285; 1924, 292. 
63 McClure, 691. 
64 Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, XIII, 
65 Ibid., 1923, II, 29-46. Full text provided. 
66 McClure, 698-699. 
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whioh vexed-the relations between (Germany and the United 
States] for half a oentury,,,67 and formed an entirely new basis 
,-
for the eoonomio relations between those nations. Besides.the 
. 
routine regulations pertaining to the personal status of German 
and Amerioan residents and oonsuls in the oountry of the other, 
the paot partioularly oonoerned itself with provisions for navi 
gation and the exohange of goods between the two powers. As' 
one souroe put it: 
The parties grant[ed] to eaoh other by Artiole 
VII the most-favor ed-nat ion treatment in regard 
to duties and taxes on the importation of all 
goods grown, produced, or manufaotured in the 
territory of the other, no matter whether such 
most-favored-nation treatment [was] granted to 
[a] third country on condition of reciprocity 
or otherwise.68 
Moreover, a special stipulation was included in the treaty whic 
prohibited the colleotion of a surtax on the flag, that is, it 
forbade any type of disoriminatory treatment of commodities im-
ported in foreign vessels as oompared to the same if introduced 
in ships of the country of destination. 
The Senate, when it was given the opportunity to pass 
judgment on this agreement, vigorously objeoted to the last-men 
tioned prOVision, for it claimed that the right of the United 
67 Ibid. 
68 E. Posse, "Germany and the United States in the 
Light of their Commercial Policies," German Commerce Yearbook: 
1928, Berlin, struppe and Winckler, Imrs;-r9-26. 
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states government to grant preferential tariffs and duties on 
goods which were imported under the American fl~ was thereby 
interfered with. These objections were based, upon s~ecial meas 
. 
ures embodied in' the Merchant_Marine Act of 1920,69 and were 
directed towards such. coromi tmen1is which appeared to weaken Amer 
ican efforts to establish a large merchant marine fleet. The 
Senate, nevertheless, gave its approval to the treaty, adding~ 
however, a clause whioh limited to twelve months the period in 
which privileges might be shown to German navigation. If not 
then terminated on ninety days previous notice, suoh rights wer 
to remain in force only two months after the enactment of Amer-
i~ legislation oancelling them. 70 
Some oriticism of the Senate's aotion appeared in vax 
ious newspapers and periodicals throughout the nation, but ther 
was no serious controversy over the matter. The editor of the 
Philadelphia InqUirer, for example, thought that such congress-
ional "taoking on" was "taking away from the President the dis-
\ 
cretion he had hitherto exercised.,,7l Again, the Philadelphia 
Public Ledger claimed that 
This reservation, in effect, gives to Oon-' 
69 Wesley L. Jones, "Merchant Marine Act of 1920," 
Proceedi~A. .£!. the Academy- .2£ Polt tical SCience, The Acadelny of 
Political Gcience, Columbia University Press, rX, February,1931 
233-242. 
70 Posse, 19-26. 
71 "A Treaty with a String to It," Literary Digesi, I LXXXIV, February 28, ~925, 14 • 
.. _-------------------------------' 
gress a,yearhenoe the power to levy dis-
oriminating tariffs whioh will favor Amer-
ioan shipping. It naturally gives Ger~~y 
the right to favor German shipping in a 
similar manner • • • [If this is done among 
all nations] it may • ' •• signalize an in-
ternational tariff.war of oonsiderable pro-
portions in whioh the United States mayor 
may not oome out [on] the preferable end of 
the horn.72 
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The treaty itself, however, was oonsidered by the Providenoe 
Journal to be "another important step toward the restoration of 
pre-war relations with the German government. n73 
In the final analysis, of oourse, opinion meant very 
li ttle, for the paot -had already been signed and, though delaye " 
went into effeot on Ootober 14, 1925. Its signifioanoe lay in 
the Amerioan aooeptanoe of an unconditional interpretation of 
its most-favored-nati~n policy, a development whioh' ha;rmonized 
with that nation's Open Door attitude and whioh oonstituted one 
more step toward the establishment of equality in the world's 
trade oonditions. 74 Finally, it remained as a bas1s for friend 
ly interoourse between Amer10a and the Reioh throughout the per 
iod of the Republic, for the Senate's power of disorimination 
was never used against 1nooming German ships. 
From 1923, then, until well after 1930 German-America 
72 Ibid. 
-
73 ..ill.9:,. 
74 McClure, 701. 
'-----------------------------------------------------~ 
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oommeroial relations were guided by the provisions agreed upon 
in the treaty made at the olose of the inflation ~eriod in the 
Reioh. As indioated in the diagr'am below,75 trade between the 
. 
two nations grew to a oonsiderable degree in the. seven years 
YEAR GERMAN IMPORTS FROM GERMAN EXPORTS TO 
THE UliITED STATES THE UNITED STATES 
1924 $ 579,676,386 $ 139,258,435 
1925 634,595,756 164,251,523 
1926 420,000,000* . 158,000,000* 
1927 492,645,000 184,425,000 
1928 483,554,000 189,908,000 
1929 410,258,652 . 254,673,542 
1930 .300,000,000· 
thereafter, always remaining, however, in favor of the United 
States. Nevertheless, it oan be readily seen that a gradual 
75 Oomp11ed from statistios given 1n the New Interna 
tiona~ ~ Book: 1925-1931, 281-282, 312-313, 295-296; 333-~34, 
656-~57; and Commerce Yearbook: 1926-1930, Washington,D.C., U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1927-1931, II, 263, 279, 288-289, 
399, 247. (*) indioates an approximation only. 
I
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levelling-off prooess manifested itself in the same short 
span, so that in'general, a distinot rise in German exports to 
Amerioan buyers paralleled a similar deorease i~ purohases made 
.,~-
in this country.. The ohief factor in this development, of 
oourse, was. Germany's determined effort to acquire a "favorable 
balanoe of trade," that is, a margin of exports over imports, 
in order to oontinue reparation payments. Only in 1929 and 
1930 did the Reioh suooeed in aocomplishing this goal in her 
all-over oommeroial transaotions,76 although this was not ap-
parent in her trade with Amerioa. 
Finally, it might be stated that throughout the years 
from 1923 to 1930 American oommeroe with Germany oontinued to 
remain greater than any other nation's business with that same 
power, yet as a buyer this oountry usually ranked third. This 
may have been due in part to the e,normous tariff rates required 
by the United States, many of whioh were set at twioe the level 
. \ 
of those found in Germany. The Amerioan government, however, 
consistently followed this same po1ioy throughout the 1920's, 
always refusing .to oonsider any agreements regarding such dut-
1es. 77 
In summary, then, muoh evidenoe seems to exist to 
76 "German Foreign Trade for 1930," Ourrent H1storl, 
XXXIII, Maroh, 1931, 941-942. 
77 Posse, 19-26. 
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show that both the- d1plomat10 and the oommero1al relat10ns 1n-
volv1ng the Un1ted states and the new German Repub110 pro-
gressed steadily throughout the 1~ed1ate post-war deoade. 
They seemed, indeed, to paralLel the growing spirit of friend-
liness desoribed in an earl1er part of th1s thesis. Yet, in 
order to make a final judgment 1n this matter the task still 
remains to br1efly soan at least one other facet of the subjeo~ 
under investigation. The next ohapter, therefore, shall deal 
with the very important topic of German-Amerioan relations 
along the lines of finanoe and reparations. 
OHAPTER IV 
GEllMAN-AMERIOAN FINANOES AT HOME AND ABROAD 
German-Amerioan finanoial relat10ns in the f1rst deo-
ade after World War I were oonoerned. for the most part, with 
the solution of two fundamental problems. F1rst of all, there 
existed the oomp11oated issue of balanc1ng the payment of Ameri-
oan war olaims against the return of German property sequestrat-
ed and held in trust by the United states government. The othel 
problem, even more intrioate, involved the partioipation of 
American finanoial experts and moneyed interests in aiding the 
Reich to fulf111 the reparations obligat1ons heaped upon 1t by 
the Treaty of Versailles. Naturally, either of these matters, 
if expla1ned in full detail would require a greater amount of 
time and spaoe than are afforded by this investigation, and 
therefore only a brief resume of tne faots conoerned w111 be 
attempted here. 
The origin of the alien property tangle lay in Ameri-
oan legislation enaoted for the purpose of national defense in 
1917. For instanoe, on Ootober 6 of that year Oongress passed 
the Trading with the Enemy Aot whioh authorized the President 
to regulate and freeze monetary, oredit, or trade transactions 
104 
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and to seize and ~old property belonging. to enemy aliens. This 
oontrol was designed, Qn the one hand, to prevent~the hostile 
use of suoh foreign holdings against the United states, and on 
. 
the other, to oonserve them for their owners until suoh time as 
they oould safely be returned. Above all, the possessors of 
goods so seized were not oonsidered as having been deprived of 
their ownership, but rather, as A. Mitohell Palmer, the first· 
Alien Property Oustodian, asserted, suoh property was merely 
plaoed under 
the authority of a oommon-law trustee; there 
is no thought of a oonfisoation or dissipa-
tion of property thus held in trust. l 
Nevertheless, at his own request, Palmer's powers wer 
enlarged on Maroh 28, 1918 to inolude "managing" the estates an 
such other holdings as were entrusted to him, so that he might 
lido any aot or thing in respeot thereof or make any disposition 
thereof ••• as if he were the absolute owner."2 The oustodi 
then garbed himself in an Amerioan flag, proolaimed his stat~ 
as a "fighter on the industrial front,' and aooordingly pledged 
the 'oomplete eradioation" of all German influenoes in enter-
prises under his oontrol, promising "their thorough neutraliza.-
1 Frank P. Huddle, "Enemy Property," Editorial Re-
searoh Reports, II, July 7, 1945, 10. 
2 ~. 
~--- --'''-__ ''''iP , __ .-.. ___ .. _-.........." ... _ ... __ .' .. _.,....-,~_.~ .•. ~.""., 
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tion into an Amerioan,oharaoter. 13 Thereafter, and for the 
next three years, or until the teohnioal state ot war with Ger-
many was deolared ended, Palmer oontinued to liquidate alien 
property with little or no regard for the oonsequences to fol-
10w. 4 
In August, 1921, when America made her separate peace 
with the Reich, the following provision was oontained in the· 
Treaty of Berlin: 
All property of the Imperial Government, or 
its suooessor ••• , and of all German na-
tionals, whioh was, on April 6, 1917, in or 
has sinoe that date oome into possession or 
control of ••• the United States of Ameri-
"ca shall be retained by [this nation] and no 
disposition thereof made, except as shall 
have been • • • or shall be provided by law 
until suoh time as the Imperial German Govern-
ment ••• or [its] suooessor, shall have ••• 
made suitable provision for the satisfaction 
of all olaims [made] against [it by injured 
American citizens].5 
Under the terms of this pact, then, the United states govern-
ment undertook to' hold as security against the payment of Ameri 
can claims great amounts of enemy property. An estimate of thi 
vast treasure might be gained from a list provided by Literary 
Digest in whioh the government was credited with having seized 
3 ~. 
4 ~., 10-11 
5 Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 30. 
about 31,818 pieoes of enemy property. Of 
these trusts there (were] 29,606 valued at 
less than $10,000, 1,052 between $10,000 and 
$50,000, 498 between $50,000 and $250,000, 
162 between $250,000 and $1,000,000. The 
total • • • [was] valued at more than $400, 
000,000, and the pr.operty embraoed [was] 
soattered over oontinental United States and 
[its] insular possessions. It oonsisted of 
industrial plants, inolusive of ohemioal and 
woolen mills, steamship lines, banks, land 
and oattle oompanies, salmon faotories, mines 
of gold, silver, and other metals, and thou-
sands of paroels of real estate and trusts re-
presented by seourities and liquid assets. 6 
10"1 
With this in mind, then, it should not be surprising 
to learn that, shortly atter this treaty was made publio, a lon 
and involved oontroversy ensued in the nation's press over the 
validity of holding suoh sequestrated German property as a host 
age in order to influenoe the fulfillment of obligations by the 
German government.? On the one side there were those individu-
als who advooated a oomplete return of all assets held to the 
private persons oonoerned, for aooording to an Amerioan treaty 
with Prussia in l8a8: 
merohants of one state resident in the other 
[were to be] given nine months to oolleot 
their debts and to settle their affairs, and (were to] be allowed to depart freely, oarry-
ing all their effeots with them. S 
6 "Doubtful Fate of Alien Property," Literary Digest,. 
LXXXIV, July 15, 1922, 14-15. 
7 An exoellent oomprehensive view of this problem is 
oontained in liThe Alien Property Question," Con§ressional £1-
gest, Washington, D.C., V, Deoember, 1926, 327- 58. 
a liThe German Patents," New Republio, New York, New 
Republio Publishing Co., XXVI, July 19, 1922, 202-203. 
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II 
• I 
! i 
,.108 
In oontradiotion to this guarantee, the !!! Republio 
observed, for instanoe, that numerous German patents were seize 
during the war and sold for their, Hfull value or tor a song." 
These possessions,. it olaimed; were "private property and more, It 
for they served the purpose of oontrol. As private possessions, 
then, this souroe unstint1ngly oalled for their return to their 
• rightful owners. It denounoed the idea that German violations 
of the same treaty, whi9h provided for immunity of Amerioan pro 
erty at sea, gave the United States government the right also t 
violate its obligations. Moreover, the periodioal oalled atten 
tion to the faot that business interests of this oountry would 
be greatly harmed if America were to set the precedent of re-
verting to confisoation in wartime.9 
In a like manner, the Nation acoused the Alien Proper 
ty Custodian of not "Amerioanizing" any of the 4,800 German pat 
ents mentioned above beoause of war emergencies, but rather to 
enable American manufaoturers·to emasculate their foreign co~ 
petitors. Said this magazine: 
The action was not a war-measure but bald com-
mercial spoliation sugar-coated with patriotic 
phraseologY-10 
9 Ibid. 
10 "Are We Amerioans Thieves?", The Nation, CXVIl, 
August 1, 1923, 104. ---, 
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As proof of its s~atements, this periodical noted how, in 1923, 
eighty-seven Amerioan firms manufaotured annuallx 64,632,187 
pounds of dyes, while nine years 'earlier only seven companies 
. 
had been able to produce 6,619;7a9 pounds. ll Finally, the ~ 
~ sarcastically asked whether it 'was to the offioe of Alien 
Property Confisoator or Alien Property Custodian that Mr. Palme 
and his suooessors were apPointed," and asserted that whatever 
gains Americans were reaping in lower prioes were based on rob-
bery and thus rooted in dishonor. It hoped that such ignominy 
would not be allowed to further tarnish the good name of the 
United States.13 
On the other side, there were advooates, not only of 
holding enemy property until Amerioan olaimants reoeived recom-
pense for losses before and during the wu,but also of aotuall), 
reimbursing injured oitizens from out of this very German prop-
erty itself. The Literary Digest, to oite one example, noted 
how seven years had alre~y passed and no settlement had been 
made for losses inflioted in the Lusitania disaster. It point-
ed also to tne fact that there had been a oonf1scat10n of Unite 
states property in Germany s1milar to that carried on in this 
oountry, of whioh Amerioans had 'got nothing back, except a de-
lusive and insulting offer to pay at the present value of the 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
-
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German mark."13 
Opinions on this same matter oame also from leading 
I" 
spokesmen in government and busi~ess. For instanoe, f~om Sen-
ator Osoar W. Underwood of Alabama oame the assertion that Ger-
man demands for the return of oertain dye and drug patents now 
held in the United States were apparently an enter1ng wedge 
whose purpose was to deprive the Amer10ans of all the oollateta 
reta1ned as seour1ty for payment of olaims against the former 
enemy. The Senator therefore suggested in Oongress that Ameri-
. 
oan olaims be satisfied out of the property in the hands of the 
Alien Property Oustodian, starting first with the liqu1dat1on 
,. 
of German government property and then resorting to the sale of 
that of individual German nationals.14 A'. Mitohell PalJDer, 
oinc€: removed from his posi t10n as oustodian, agreed with Under 
wood, remarking: 
The Underwood bill is entirely feasible and an 
entirely proper method under the Treaties and 
the Trading with the Enemy Aot.15 
Probably the most noted authority to take the same 
stand was Samuel Flagg Bemis, then professor of history at Whit 
man College 1n Wash1ngton state. Said Bem1s: 
13 "Unole Sam to Hand Fritz His Bill,""L1terary.Qi-
geat, LXXIV, August 12, 1922, 14. 
14 Ib1d. 
It is useless to speak of oolleoting.anything 
from Germany unless out 'of this sequestrated 
property. This oan easily and honorably be 
done • ••• 16. ,. 
. ",." 
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He furthe~ noted that it was "n~~dle~s to add that [if the pro 
erty was actually returned], lt (would] be t~en over by the 
Allies to satisfy the unextinguished olaims of their subjeots • .J.'7 
Bemis's main argument hinged on the differenoe betwee 
the meaning of oonfiscation and that of sequestration, the l~t­
ter of whioh he defined as "a milder procedure whioh reoognizes 
the title of ••• property to be held in trust for the owner.' 
The American government, he olaimed, had only used the second 
mean s, and then; only against merohant s living in Germany. In 
this last conneotion, he quoted James W. Garner, 'an authority 
on international law, as being of the opinion that: 
It does not • • • appear that the property 
of any German: subjeot residing in the United 
States ••• was seized or sOld. le , 
He olaimed, therefore, that no violations of the le28 paot ooul 
be oharged. 
In general, then, Bemis favored the use of enemy prop 
erty as payment for Amerioan war olaims. Yet, to aavoid an ac-
16 Samuel F. Bemis, "Shall We Forget the Lusitania?lI, 
The Outlook, aXXXI, August 30, 1922, 710-713. 
17 Ibid. 
-
18 Ibid. From James W. Garner, "Treatment of Enemy 
Aliens," American-Journal of International Law, XII, Ootober, 
1918, 765-766. - -
I 
~ 11·1' 
,I, 
112 
cusation by Germany of -Aveiled oonfisoat1on",' he reoommended 
the sett1ng up of a jOint olaims o'ommiss10n, but lf1th the under 
standing that all olaims awarded-to Amer1can olaimants would be 
paid out of German property then-1n sequestration, with the 
, \ 
balance returned to the Reioh. 
Bemis, it seems, had a keen i~sight into the whole 
oontroversy over alien prop~rty, for his suggestions were, in' 
part, being oarr1ed out at almost·the same time as they were of 
fered. On August 10, 1922, the German and Am~rioan governments 
established a Joint Mixed Ola1ms Oommission whioh was to adjudi 
oate debt olaims of Amerioan oit1zens agai~st the German state, 
to process olaims for property of suoh persons 'arising sinoe 
July 31, 1914, in respeot to damage to, or .seizure of, their 
property, rights, or 1nterests,' and to handle other demands fo 
"loss or damage to whioh the United States or 1ts nat10nals 
[bad] been subjeo~ed."19 The funotions of this oommission, the, 
were identioal with those assigned in the Versailles Treaty to 
the Reparat10n Commission, the Olearing Offioes, the Mixed Arbi 
ral Tribunal, and other groups for investigating olaims. 20 
19 Huddle, "Enemy Property," 11; Forei~Relations, 
Paris Peaoe Conferenoe, XIII, 627-630; 1922, II, ~ -265. 
20 Foreign Relations, Paris Peaoe Conferenoe, XIII, 
627-630. 
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For some time afterwards the German possessions in 
question were still withheld from their owners, Seoretary of 
state Hughes being of the mind ,of Underwood~ Bemis~ and others. 
As a result~ muoh criticism was heaped upon his head for this 
stand~ espeoially in the Amerioan papers. The Nation, in mid-
1922, referred Hughes to Alexander Hamilton's Nineteenth Camil-
lus Letter~ and asked him to note its legality, partioularly • 
after his preaohing against oonfisoation in Mexioo and Russia.2 
It oommended the House of Representatives for ignoring the Stat 
Department head and approving a bill, later known as the Winslo 
Act, whDch authorlzed the return of some twenty-eight thousand 
alien property trusts of less than ten thousand dollars eaoh~ 
and to pay an equal sum on all holdings of larger value.22 Yet, 
even thls was attaoked by the ~Republio which pOinted out 
that such returns~ while ellminatlng ninety per cent of the 
trusts then held, stl11 retained nlnety per oent of the proper-
ty. It oontalned an appeal for a total restoration, saying: \ 
Every oonsideratlon, ••• morallty, nation-
al tradltion, treaty, lnternatlonal law~ ex-
press promise, and self-interest, urge upon 
Congress the duty to • • • return all of the 
21 "National Honor: Hughes vs Hamilton,· The Nation, 
CIVII, August 8, 1923~ 131. 
22 Huddle, "Enemy Property," 13. 
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sequestrated propertY-23 
• 
The alien property tangle continued in.- this fashion 
i 
for the entire first post-war decade. Late in 1923, however, 
the Germans began to submi t payments both on awards made by the 
Mixed Claims Commission and on their war obligations to the 
United States government, the latter reaohin~ about twenty mil-
lion dollars. Returns of property approximating half of tha~ 
sum were made to citizens in the Reich that same year, wh1le 1n 
1924 and 1925 these payments rose to thirteen and fourteen mil-
lion dollars, respectively.24 By 1932, a total of sixty-one 
million dollars had been paid in this fashion. The Winslow Act 
further required the return of all patents, copyrights, and 
trade marks vested by the Alien Property Custodian and still in 
his possession. The number of non-remitted patents left in 192 
was 5,18S, all of which were back in German hands before the 
end of 1928. 
Throughout the Coolidge Administration, however, pro-
\ 
~ 
posals for returning all property to the nation's former foes 
\ 
were oonstantly and oonsistently opposed by the Amerioan Claim-
ants Association. Consequently, a compromise was reached 1n 
23 "The Sequestrated A11en Property, II ~ Republic, 
XXVI, Augt\st 2, 1922, 269-270. 
24 Huddle, "Enemy Property,U 13_ 
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Maroh,1928, when the·Oongress authorlzed the Battlement of War 
Clalms Aot. By thls agreement, Amerloans stl11 unlndemnified 
.. 
were awarded one hundred thousand dollars on eaoh of their 
olaims plus eighty per oentof the remainder. German claimants, 
on the other hand, were allowed eighty per oent of all their 
valid olaims, the other twenty per oent going to pay Amerioan 
requests.25 • 
Thus, a total of forty-three to eighty-six million 
dollars were remitted to German olaimants in 1929 and 1930, re-
speotively, wlth a grand aggregate of $175,953,813. having been 
p~d by 1932. At the same time, property valued at approximate 
ly $613,387,500 was dlsposed of, so that by mid-1935 the out-
standing claims of German nationals amounted to less than sixty 
two milllon dollars, and unpaid Amerioan awards totalled some-
I 
thing near fifty-eight million dollars. An agreement providing 
for the diSCharge of Germany's war indebtedness to the United 
states was signed on June 23, 1930, but sinoe no payments were 
made after September, 1931, it seems unneoessary to explain 
this latter paot. 26 
The final topio whioh' shall be oonsidered in this the 
25 Ibid. These funds were to be replaoed by either 
a Congressional appropriation, or by future payments made by 
the German government. 
26 ~.; Foreign Relations, 1930, III, 106-109 • 
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" 
sis is that of Amerio~'s relationship to the greatest enigma of 
, .. 
the 1920's -- the settlement of the German reparations problem 
.. 
growing out of World War I. * Aotually, this entire issue should 
, 
have been oonfined to the European oontinent,a? for Amerioans 
asked no part in the war indemnity nor did the nation partioi-
. 
pate in the Reparation Oommission, but due to the position of 
the United States as a major power and the world's top oredit. 
or,2S this oountry soon found itself almost as deeply involved 
in the reparations dispute as did Germany herself. 
Probably the first real oontaot in this matter between 
,~ 
the Amerioan nation and that of the Germans ooourred in early 
1921 when Dr. Walter Simons, the German Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs, made mention of an international loan to Ellis Dresel, 
the Amerioan oommissioner in the Reioh.2a The loan, argued Si-
mons, was neoessary to bolster German oredit, whioh undermined 
by the general mortgage olause of the Treaty of Versailles, was 
in need of resusoitation in order to pay the one hundred thirty-
two billion marks30 asked by the Allies in reparations. Spe~-
27 President Hoover stressed this point in his press 
statement of June 20, 1931, in whioh he announced American pro-
posals for a world-wide moratorium. William Starr Myers, ed., 
~ state Papers ~ other Publio Writings of Herbert Hoover, 
Garden City, New York, Doubleday, Doran and~o., 1934,-r;-593. 
28 Brooks, 129, sets Amerioa's outstanding credits i 
1919 at $12,000,000,000. 
29 Charles P. Howland, American Forel~ Relations: 
1928, New Haven, Yale University Press, 192s:,--3 344. 
~o $31,500,000,000. 
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for the American government, Seoretary of State.Hughes declined 
to act on the German suggestion, adding that this country held 
. 
Germany guilty for the war and believed'in total,reparation for 
. 
damages done. Hughes advised':, instead, a renewed attempt by t1:e 
Germans to deal directly with the Allies for settlement of thei 
difficulties. 31 
Later in 1921, the German government again appeale~ t 
the United States, this time in the person of President Hard-
ing,32 to mediate the reparation question and to !~X the sum to 
be paid by the Germans to the Allies. Full oo-operation was pr 
mised. The State Department refused this seoond request, sayin 
This government could not agree to mediate the 
question of reparations with a view to acting 
as umpire in its settlement •••• [But if] 
the German government will promptly formulate 
such proposals as would present a proper basis 
for discussion ••• (the United States] will 
consider bringing the matter to the attention 
of the Allied Governments. • • .33 
, 
. After this episode, ,.li tt1e was heard of the reparatio 
quarrel in American ciroles until August, 1922. A new appeal 
was then sent to Washington from the,Reioh, this time in quest 
of United States interoession with the Reparation Commission to 
accept German pledges of payment. 34 Still quite aloof, the 
31 Foreign Relations, 1921, II, 37-40, 49. 
32 Ibid., 40. 
33 Ibid., 44. 
34 ~., 1923, II, 160. 
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State Department expressed its adamant unwillingness to aocept 
this responsibility. The oond1t1on'of German finances, in the 
... 
- ' 
meantime, continued to grow so grave that even such a prominent 
. 
American as Thomas W. Lamont -of J.P. Morgan and Company refused 
to take any initiative in the matter of strengthening them. 
Strangely enough" Lamont seemed to look for aotion from the 
government on the"whole issue of reparations. 35 
He was not far from wrong,for in October authorities 
in the nation's oapitaladvised the setting up of a business-
man's oommittee to solve the problem, but Frenoh opposition 
oaused the shelving of the entire matter until the year's end. 
Only on Deoember 29, 1922 did the first really significant act-
ion come from this oountry when Secretary Hughes addressed the 
Amerioan HistorioalAssooiat1on in New Haven partly as follows: 
What is our attitude toward the question of 
reparations ••• ? •• Some of our people 
have suggested that the United States should 
assume the role of arbiter ••• [but since] 
we have not been asked ••• it would be an 
extraordinary and unpreoedented thing for us 
to ask for suoh an invitation. 
I do not think that we should endeavor to 
take on such a burden of responsibility. We 
have quite enough to bear without drawing to 
ourselves all the ill feeling which would re-
sult from disapPOinted hopes and a settlement 
which was viewed as forced upon nations by 
this country which at the same time is demand-
ing the payment of its debts. 
If • • • statemen cannot agree • • • what can 
35 ~., 165. 
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be done' 
Why should not they (statesmen) lnvlte men of f 
the hlghest authority ln finanoe in t~eir re- ~. 
speotive oountries -- men of suoh prestige, ex-
perienoe and honor that their agreement upon 
the amount to be paid, and upon a financial-
plan for working out the payments, would be ac-
cepted throughout the world as the most author-
i tative expression obtainable? • .' • I have no 
doubt that distinguished Americans would be 
willing to serve on suoh a commission.36 
Sani ty, however, was thrown to the winds, and wi tb it 
the American suggestions, when the Frenoh seized the Ruhr val-
ley on January 11, 1923. Reparatlons from the Reioh were meant 
to be foroefully exaoted and thus the plan of the previous year 
somewhat faded into obsouri ty. Amerioan opinion leaned, on 
the one hand, from delight in the Frenoh aotion to condemnation, 
on the other, of the Ruhr polloy as rendering impossible the re 
ouperation of Germany's finanoes and the impairment of all 
Europe's eoonomio rehabilltatlon. 37, Aotion by the Harding Ad-
ministration was demanded in a few oases, but no suoh offioial 
move was ever made. Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, American 
troops were even removed from the Rhineland at this oritical 
time. 
In May, 1923, the idea of an experts' committee was 
again revived, this time by the.German government itself. 38 
36 Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of Reparations, Lon-
don, Macmillan and Co., 1939, 24Y-~44. --
37 Foreign Relations, 1923, 52-53. 
38 ~., 57. 
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Hughes temporarily favored a oonferenoe solely between the 
French and the Germans, but later39 agreed to Amerioan partioi-
,. 
pation in a general series of talks if suoh ooul~ be arranged 
unoffioially. On Deoember 7_the plan was finally agreed upon 
and the Reparation Oommission deoided to appoint two oommittees 
to investi'gate the whole reparatio~s, issue, the first to seek I 
a balanoe of the German budget ~d a stabilization of the Reioh's 
ourrenoy~ and the seoond to estimate the flow of oapital from 
Germany in order to, foroe its return.40 
On the very day that the Reparations Oommission forme 
\ the above oommittees~ the Germans offioially requested Amerioan 
representation on that group to whioh was entrusted the Reich's 
budget and ourrenoy problem. 4l Acoordingly, through the able 
intervention of James A. Logan, sole Amerioan observer on the 
commission, oonsent of the United states was secured,42,and in-
vitations were sent during the following month to the Amerioan 
delegates. Among these were General Oharles G. Dawes, a well-
\ 
known Chicago finanoier and later V1oe-fres1dent of the United 
states, and Mr. Owen D. Young, an exper1enoed lawyer and busi-
39 Mid-Ootober. 
40 Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 104. Only the work 
of the first oommittee will be oonsidered here. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Carl Bergmann, The Histor~ of Reparations, Boston, 
New York, Houghton Mifflin Co:;-1~7, 2 1:-
121 
nessman, both of, wham were asked to join the first oomm1ttee. 43 
These exper1enoed finano1ers, together with a n~ber of others 
from England, Franoe, Italy, and Belgium, a group popularly 
known as the Dawes Committee> worked assiduously for three 
months beginning in mid-January, 1924 in order to prepare the 
plan whioh they laid before the Reparation Commission on April 
9. 44 • 
The Dawes Plan, as this reoommendation oame to be 
oalled, was readil~ aooepted by that body, by the Allies at the 
London Oonferenoe of July-August,- 1924, and ultimately by the 
German government itself. Briefly, it was merely a provision-
a145 solution to the reparation nightmare, for it emphasized th 
faot that no definite sum was or oould, at that time, be settle 
for total payments. Nevertheless, the soheme had its merits fo 
it Hreplaoed the fantastic annuities of former plans by amounts 
wh10h seemed bearable -- at least for a few years,1I46 thus as-
suring a quiet period between Germany and the Allies for a shor 
, \ 
time to oome. Again, it aoknowledged the Weimar government's 
need for a period of f1nanoial rest, and thus provided for a 
43 Dawes, 246. 
44 Gustav Stolper, German Eoonom~: 1870-1940, New 
York, Reynal and Hitohcock, 1940, 168-225.ex~ Dawes, 278-5 
the Dawes 
Germany's 
1929, 69. 
45 Said Dawes himself:"The only thing definite about 
Plan is the faot that it is not definite." otto Hoetscl, 
Domestic and Foreign Policies, New Haven, Yale U. Pres, 
46 Stolper, 168-225. 
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span whioh inoluded not only a time of quasi-total indulgence, 
but also one of merely parti.1 resumption of pa~ents. Repara-
tions annuities were therefore reduced to one billion gold 
• t 
marks for the 1924-1925 fiscal year, and only gradually raised 
to two and one-half billion marks in the "normal year" of 1928-
1929. Above all, an eight hundred million "mark reparation loan, 
internationally SUbscribed, was authorized for the revival and 
stabilization of German currenoy.47 
In the Dawes Plan, then, oame the oulmination of a 
long sertes of mixed American gestures and efforts to aid Ger-
many 1n solving the reparations dilemma. In faot, one publica-
tion of the day went so far as to say: 
• • • in many ways the most oonvincing par-
tioipation of tne United States in interna-
tional problems apart from those admitted as 
suoh is associated with the settlement of 
the reparation question. Beginning with an 
address by Secretary Hughes at New Haven in 
1922, and running down through the exchanges 
of opinion between London ,and Washington in 
the Fall of 1923, to the work of the Dawes 
committees themselves, the settlement of the 
reparat10ns problem has been a matter in 
whioh the United states has been the pr1me-
mover and more influential factor. 48 
This same source, however, adds the appropriate comment: "That 
this action has been 'unofficial' reveals not so much the natur 
47 Americmls part1oipation in this and other German 
loans during tne 1920's shall be oonsidered presently. 
48 liThe Myth 01' American Isolation," Current History, 
XXI, November, 1924, 205-206. 
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of the attitude o~ the Washington government. n49 Suoh a oriti-
oism was undoubtedly true, for the Germans were most assuredly 
.. 
able to look to Amerioans as having been olosely assooiJted 
with the whole Dawes idea, but not to Amerioa as suoh. Re gar d-
,. 
ing the reparations almost as "tainted gold," the Washington 
. 
government was silent, reserved, and non-oommittal throughout 
all disoussions on the subjeot of war payments. 50 It merely, 
olosed its eyes, so tospeak, in order to allow its oitizens to 
aid in reaching a solution. An insight into .the administra-
tion's mind in this matter might well be gained from a passage 
spoken by Secretary of state Hughes who, while in London in 
July, 1924, explained: 
You may oount on our interest and assistance 
in the necessary measures to assure the eoon-
omio rehabilitation of Europe. It does not 
matter that this aid is not given by the Govern-
ment. Without wishing to say anything oontro-
versial on this subject, I may give it as my 
conviotion that had we attempted to make Amer-
ica's oontribution to the recent plan of ad-justment a governmental matter, we should have 
been involved in a hopeless debate, and there 
would have been no adequate action. We shoul~ 
have been beset with demands, objeotions, in- f 
struotions. This is not the way to make an 
Amerioan contribution to eoonomio revival. 
You have the Dawes Plan, and you have the 
partioipation of Amerioan experts with the li-
berty ot' constructive effol't, which was essen-
tial, beoause it was undertaken in the only 
49 Ibid. 
50 Henry L~' Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active 
Servioe in Peace and War, New York, Harper and Bros7; 1948, 202. 
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way in whioh suooess was possible- 51 
Similarly, President Ooolidge, in oommending Gemeral Dawes upon 
.. 
his splendid work, remarked: 
• _ • had you bee~ representing the govern-
ment you would have been hampered, and no 
doubt your proposed aotion would have be-' 
oome the objeot of politioal oontroversy 
here. I have said that you and your asso-
oiates have represented not the Government, 
but the Amerioan mind. S2 • 
Finally, it might be added that both Germany and the 
United States gained as well as lost muoh in the extended oper-
ation of the Dawes Plan. Immediately upon the floatation of 
the Reparation Loan in Ootober, 1924, an era 'of prosperity, un-
equalled in the history of the Reioh, oame into existenoe, and 
all phases of German eoonomio life hummed with aotivity for the 
next five years. 53 Nevertheless, it proved in the end to be an 
illusion only, for the Weimar state, living as it was on bor-
, -
rowed money, remained in existenoe and paid its reparation dues 
o~ly so long as its finanoial veins were supplied with fresh 
loans from abroad. When, in 1929 and 1930, the flo\Y of oredits 
was suddenly halted, the whole. house of oards oollapsed, and 
Germany flung open its doors to National Sooialism. 
51 Oharles E. Hughes, !h! Pathway ~ Peaoe, New York, 
Harper and Brothers, 1925, 108. 
52 Dawes, 247. 
53 A comprehensive study ot this phase of German eco1''.,;-
omy 1s presented in James W. Angell, The Recoverr .2! Germany, 
New Haven, Yale University Press, 1929, passim. 
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The United.States, too, reaped a similar fate, for 
after waging a long'diplomatio battle with the Allies,54 Ameri-
,. 
oa suooeeded in tapping the reparations annuities paid by Ger-
. 
many as compensation for oost of the Amerioan ocoupation troops 
. . 
in the Rhineland and as payment of oertain war claims still not 
remitted by the We1mar regime. All in ail, suoh mon1es netted 
this nation almost ninety-two million dollars from Germany ~ 
six annual 1nstallments between 1924 and 1930.55 Yet, like the 
Reich, the United States, too, eventually was laid low by the 
world depress10n which began in 1929 and whioh is known today 
to have been due in large part to the internat10nal finanCial 
polioies follow1ng the Great War. 
In matters of reparations, then, America was almost a 
olosely oonneoted to Germany in the post-war years as she was t 
her wartime asso01ates. This affiliation is even more emphatio 
ally revealed when attent10n is drawn to the amount of a1d ~­
in aotual dollars and oents -- whioh Americans aocorded to Ger-
man interests dur1ng the years between 1921 and 1930. Conse-
quently, it might be well to briefly scan the situation as it 
concerned American loans to the Reich at that time, espeoially 
54 Forei~n Relations, 1924, II, 1-124; 1925, II, 1~3 
163; 1926, II, 156-163; 1927, II, 722-724. 
55 Charles R.8. Harris, Germany's Foreign Indebted-
ness, London, Oxford U. Press, 1935, 93. Cites the ECOnO!llis"f, 
Heparations and War Debts Supplement, January 23, 19~2. 
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sinoe the latter formed such an integral part of the entire 
reparations picture. 
Post-war financial relations between the United States 
. 
and Germany fell into two rather well defined phases, one ex-
te~ding through the year 1923 and the other beginning tne next 
year with the Dawes Reparation Loan. During both periods, the 
stability and trustworthiness of German ourrenoy played the • 
leading role in determining the extent of Amerioan lending, al-
though d1strust 1n this oountry of European "politioal schem-
ing" and a homespun sent1ment against foreign entanglements 
were likew1se important in this matter. 56 
Pr10r to 1924 ,very 11ttle long-term investing was done 
by Amer10ans in German interests. In faot, during 1919 and 192 
even Herbert Hoover, in trying to solioite credit outlays from 
both the government in Washington and from individual bankers 
for purposes of German economio rehab11itation, was largely un-
suocessful. 57 The only loans then acoorded to the Reioh were 
\ 
privately plaoed issues whioh were mustered by German sympathiz 
ers in the United States and by a limited number of conservativ 
souls who were vaguely oonfident of Germany's quiok recovery. 
All in all, between five hundred million and a billion dollars 
56 Brooks, America ~ Germany, 129. 
57 ~., 121-130. 
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oame to be invested in the Reiohbefore 1923 when the great in-
flation oaused most of these Amerioan seourities to beoome en-
o· 
tirely worthless. 58 
Toward the end of 1923~ of oourse, oame.the "miracle 
of the Rentenmark," and once more German ourrenoy beoame stabil 
ized. Within six to eight months foreign credits, mostly from 
the United States~ onoe again began flowing into the fatherland, 
so that even before the Reparation Loan was floated in October, 
1924, several German firmssuoh as the Sug~ Indust~y, the 'Ger-
man Potash and Rhine-Westphalia'Coal Syndioates, the North Ger-
man Lloyd, the Dye Works, and tne German Petroleum Oompany were 
able to raise some funds under short-term contraots. 59 
As was mentioned previously, the Dawes Committee~ in 
its proposed solution of the reparations muddle, had advised 
f 
the funding of an international loan to the Reioh as a means of 
improving the trustwo~thiness of its finanoes. Negotiations fo 
the oarrying out of this gigantic enterprise were held at the 
close of the London Oonference of 1924~ a speoial parley which 
had met to consider tne aoceptability of the Dawes Plan. For 
some time a waiting attitude was assumed by a number of America 
58 Ibid.~ 140. Harris, in his Forei~ Indebtedness, 
3, sets the amount at 11 milliards (billions,' 0 ReIChmn;.trKs. 
59 Robert R. Kuozynski~ American Loans to Germ~1~, 
New York, Tne Macmillan Co., 1927, 4. 
las 
and Brit~sh bankers who~ during the oonferenoe~ had demanded 
that the proposed loan be more striotly guaran~eed against po-
. ~ 
1/1 litioal oomplioations than was provided by the experts' re-
. 
port. This situation~ however~ lasted only until late Septem-
, 
ber, when disoussions were resumed~ this time between represent 
atives of the Allies and those of the Germans. The former were 
represented by agents of John Pierpont Morgan and Company ~d 
of the Bank of England, while the German delegates inoluded Dr. 
Rjalmar Sohaoht, president of the' Reiohsbank, and the finance 
minister, Dr. Hans Luther. 
Negotiations for the Reparation Loan, whioh Bergmann 
says were "brief and more or less diotated,uSO culminated in th 
signing of a final agreement on Ootober 14, 1924. This paot 
provided for the issuanoe of an eight hundred million mark loan, 
internationally subsoribed, to the German Republio, for which 
annual interest rate of seven per oent was to be paid by the re 
oeiving party. Amerioa, with its surplus of uninvested capital, 
\ 
was induoed, by Qtrict seourity measures in the Dawes Plan, to 
aooept a tranohe of one hundred ten million dollars, while smal 
er quantities were assumed by the British, the Frenoh, and 
others. Four days ~ater, the Amerioan securities were placed 01 
sale by J.P. Morgan and Oompany in New York, and indications of 
60 Bergmann, History of Reparations, 280. 
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suooess "ere 'i!Mlediately apparent. 61 
German oredit stabilization, then, pl~s the added im-
petus of the Dawes Reparati'on Loan, signalled the beginning of 
a long period of intense financial intercourse between the Reic 
and Amerioa. For six years following 1924 immense quantities 0 
credit passed from the United States to German interests abroad 
Most of' the earlier advances were ~iven in the form of shortt-
term loans, but as soon as it appeared oertain that German fin-
anoes were not open to further inflation, numerous long-term 
contracts were likewise negotiated. 
The question now arises as to "hom, speoifioally, did 
most of the American money go. It would be almost impossible, 
of oourse, to list individually even the ohief reoipients of 
such funds, but a olassification of types of German borrowers 
oan easily be given. There were, in general, four groups who 
floated loans outside of Germany: first, the German government 
at Berlin; seoond, individual states and munio1pa11ties; third, 
\ 
varioue large 1ndustr1al, commercial, and f1nancial organiza-
tions; and finally, innumerable private establishments such as 
relig10us groups and small banks. 62 
61 ~. 
62 Robert R. Kuczynski, Bankers' Profits from German 
Loans, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute, 1932, 5. 
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Surprisingly enough~ of all these four olasses, the 
Republio itself was not the largest reoipient qt Amerioan funds, 
although it did take a fair share of the total amount loaned 
.---BORROWERS IN NUMBER or AMOUNT FLOATED' 
GERMANY LOANS IN AMERICA 
German Republic 2 $ 208,250,000 
States 11 115,650,000 
Provinces, Mu-
nioipa11ties 20 103,425,000 
Pub11c Util-
1ty Corpora- 41 276,883,000 
t10ns 
Industrial 
Oorporations 28 214,418,500 
Publio Credit 
Inst1tutions 19 213,435,000 
Private Oommer-
oial Oorporations 11 94,070,000 
Religious Organ-
izations 3 , 12,900,000 
TOTAL 135 $1,239,031,500 
out, most of whioh was re-borrowedby private ooncerns in Ger-
many. On the contrary, the heaviest drain on creditors in this 
country came from pub1io utility and industrial corporations 
and from institutions of public oredit. In fact, out of the 
one hundred thirty-five separate loan floatations carried on in 
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the United States between 1924 and 1930, seventy';'eight emanated 
from one or other of these souroes. Inoluded among them were 
suoh prominent names as Friedrioh Krupp, Ltd., August 'rhyssen 
. 
Iron and Steel Works, the General Electrio Oompany in Germany, 
Saxon Publio Works, the United Steel Works Oorporation, and the 
Berlin City Eleotrio Oompany.63 
States, munioipalities, and small financial groupb 
made up the rest of America's post-war debtors in Germany. As 
the statistioal ohart on the previous page shows,64 at the end 
of 1930 olose to one billion two hundred forty million dollars 
had been sent across the Atlantio, an amount whioh, not includ-
ing those loans privately plaoed, oonstituted approximately 
seventy per oent of all the Reioh's foreign borrowing during th 
past six years. 65 Consequently, it is not surprising to find 
that only the largest and most wealthy interests in the United _: 
States were able to handle this tremendous monetary traffic. 
These inoluded, in part, J.P. Morgan and Company; the Equitable 
\ 
Trust Oompany; the Ohase National Bank; Dillon, Read, and Oom-
65 Ibid.; Kuozynski, Loans, 43-50. 
64 Kuczynski, Profits, 5. 
65 Angell, 191; Harris, 10. Howland, American For-
~ Relations: 1930, 467, puts the amount at $1,~lO,609,OOO. Quotes United States Department of Oommeroe, American Under-
writing of German Securities, Trade Information Bulletin, No. 
648. -
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pany;Goldman, Saohs. and Oompany; Speyer and Oompany;; the Guar-
anty Trust Oompany; Amerioanand Oontinental co!por~~n; and 
Harris, Forbes and Oompany. 66. . 
It might be noted.at this pOint that of all the cred-
its invested in Germany, whether in the Weimar government, the 
German states and oities, or in industry or commeroe, no por-
tion was ever given by the United states government as such, 
This negative policy by Washington harkened back to the very 
early part of the 1920~s, when a radical change took place in 
this oountry's official attitude toward all foreign lending. 
In previous years loans had been made with an eye to influencin 
the aotions of some foreign power, but now, with American pres-
tige at its highest, such advances were deemed inconsistent 
with the oountry's national interests. 67 
As a natural result of this program, loans from Ameri 
oans -- espeoially from the government itself -- to Germany wer 
regarded during this entire post-war deoade in the same hostile 
manner by the various departments in the nation's oapital. In 
faot, as early as Maroh, 1922, President Harding asked certain 
loan-issuing bankers to submit all their proposed oredit outlay 
66 Kuozynski, Loans, 24-26, 43-50. 
67 John T. Madden, et al, America's E~erience as a 
Oredi tor Nation, New York, Prentice-Hall, 1937, 9. . - -
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for approval by ,the State Department. This request was agreed 
to by those offioials attending, although a later protest was 
. ~ 
vOioed by Governor Strong of the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank. 68 Nevertheless, with-exception of the Dawes Reparation 
Loan of 1924, whioh was personally reoommended by President Co 
lidge,69 the offioial Amerioan mind on this matter continued to 
remain adamant in its new outlook. • 
Application of this polioy toward the Reich occurred 
several times after the Dawes advanoe was completed, notably in 
late 1924 when aotual ooncern was expressed by the State Depart 
ment over requests for oredit by numerous German states and 
cities. For example, a creditor intending to proceed with a 
loan to the state of Bremen was carefully advised to pay specia 
attention to Article 248 of the Versailles Treaty which provid-
ed for a first mortgage on all German property and lands,70 and 
to inquire specifioally into the attitude of the Reich's Financ 
Minister whose approval to all such loans was required by a law 
of the republic. 71 A year later, in the faoe of still hea~ier 
68 William Starr Myers, The Foreign Policies of Her-
bert Hoover: 1929-1933, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940 
189=191; Kuozynski, Loans, 12; Madden, ~ al, 241-242. 
69 Calvin Coolidge, Messa~e of the President •.. to th 
Congress ••• December ~ 1924, Washing~on;-O.C., U.S. Goverlwen 
Printing Office, 1924, 12; James W. Angell, The Financial For-
eign Policy of the United States, New York, Council of--fOreign 
RelatIon~, 1953:-S5. 
70 Foreign Relations, Paris Peace ~., XIII, 530. 
71 Madden, et aI, 247-248. 
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requests tor funds from abroad, warnings identioal with these 
were spread broadcast over the entire American finanoial world 
.. 
by the same authority. The department also added: 
[Make sure that any contemplated] loans are to 
be used for productive and self-supporting ob-jects that will improve, directly or indirect-
ly, the economic condition of Germany, and 
tend to aid tha~ country in meeting its finan-
cial obligations at home and abroad. 72 
• Exhortations of this kind continued throughout the 
1920's, but if at all, were only moderately effective, for, as 
has been shown, over one and a quarter billion dollars were ac-
corded to German interests by persons in the United States be-
fore the and of 1930. At no time, of oourse, after the Dawes 
loan did the government explioitly advise or forbid the advanc-
ing of oredits to Germany. Rather, it offered "no Objectionu73 
to such acts, a policy which led to serious' repercussions again t 
President Hoover after considerable losses were incurred in the 
depression years or 1930 and 1931. 74 
As a final note on this subjeot or loans to Germa;ny, 
it should be stated that, contrary to some expeotations, the 
Weimar government likewise took a firm stand against indiscrim-
inate American financial advanoes to German interests, especial 
72 Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 177-178. 
73 Madden, ~ al, 242; Foreign Relations, 1925, II, 
187. 
74 Myers, Foreign Policies 2! Hoover, 197-198 . 
........ - -..-' "'1! ~ ~""'.'~' __ ~~.""!' __ •• ~ ___ .-~ .. _ .~~ ._._~ .. _ .... """ _~" ,_. 
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11 if those interests happened to be munioipalities whioh sough 
to oarry on non-produotive oivio improvements. 75 Thus Gustav 
.. 
Stresemann himself, the Reioh's able Foreign 14ihister during th 
, 
later 1920's, said of suoh loans: 
We need the milliards that have flowed into 
our trade and industry in the form of foreign 
loans • • • • But only the milliards that are 
wholly and solely applied for productive pur-
poses oan be a justifiable addition to our ca-
pital, while non-productive foreign loans are 
a heavy oharge on our resources' 76 
Kuozynski olarifies this pOint even more when he says: 
In view of the great ne~d of oapital it was 
feared that the municipalities would take un-
due advantage of the first opportunity of-
fered by the opening of the foreign oapital 
market, of aoquiring long-term oredits, and 
they would fail to observe that restraint 
whioh consideration for the German balance of 
payments and consequently for the currency ne-
cessitated' 77 
Leading German industrialists and finanoiers expresse 
this very fear when they announoed that a oontinuation of suoh 
loans would be 
• disastrous for the future of German eoonomy 
75 Howland, American Foreise Relations: 1928, 338. 
76 Erio Sutton, ed.,-Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, 
Letters, ~ Papers, London, Maomillan and Co., 19~III, 2~. 
77 Kuozynski, Loans, 5. Quotes Denkschrift llber das 
Arbei tsgeb1et ~ die Tatigkei t der Beratungsste'11e, fUr Aus==--
iandskredite vom 1. Januar 1925 ore zum ~O. September 19~ (Pu 
lished by tne Reion Finance Minister~.~ ----
'~ .. _-----------------------------
and.(wouldJ eventually lead to interterenoe, 
on the part of the Transfer Oommittee, .with 
t·he Ct]ransfer out of Germany of the interest 
oharges .involved.7S .. 
138 
In view of this alar~ and beoause. there was greater 
need for loans to industry and agrioulture, Jaoob G. Sohurman, 
Amerioan Ambassador to .Berlin, believed that 
. -
the demands of the munioipalities should be 
relegated .to the baoksroundj and • .~. that 
we [the United states] oan do no better ser-
vioe to Germany and ourselves than to dis-
oourage the further plaoing of German muni-
cipal loans in America. 79 
A year later he notified th~ State Department that 
Sohaoht C*]himself ••• is oonvinoed that 
to revert to the oomparatively free polioy of 
foreign borrowing by publio oorpor.ations [in 
Germany] is absolute follY.SO 
The Weimar government oonsequently attempted in 1925 
to put a ourb on suoh unbridled borrowing, but beoause of a ma-
jority laok 1n the Reiohstag, a law requir1ngoffioial approval 
for monetary requests abroad was greatly weakened and was there 
fore easily evaded.al Nevertheless, while the law was inefteot 
ive in some plaoes, it was evidently able to produoe results in 
others" for as Wertheimer states: 
Almost one-third (31.31%) of the total pub-
78 Foreign Relations" 1925, II, 173-174. 
79 ~. 
80 Ibid., 1926, II, 202. *Hjalmar Sohaoht" presi-
dent of the ReTCh8bank. 
81 Ibid., 1925" II, 173-174j Kuozynski, Lonna, 11. 
:il 
i;.' 
-110 debt of the Federal States and the Hansa 
c1t1es on March 31, 1930 had been borrowed 
abroad, by far the largest portion having 
been raised in the United States. O~ the 
other hand, only ten per cent (as of March 
31, 1929) of the funds borrowed by the mu-
nicipalities represented direot foreign loans-82 
13,7 
From 192,4, then, until 1928, German-American relation 
revolved, for the most part, around the making of the Dawes Pl 
and the extending of United States financial oredits to inter-
ests in the Reioh. Events, however, did not ohange radically i 
the next three years, for late in Ootober, 1928, upon the sug-
gestion of S. Gilbert Parker, Agent General for Reparations, a 
new oommittee of experts -- inoluding Amerioans -- was called t 
give final form to the deoade-old question of the German indem-
n1ty. Unoffioially representing America,83 were Owen D. Young, 
previously associated with the Dawes Plan, and John Pierpont 
Morgan, Amerioan finanoier .Ii!!!:I. exoellenoe alre.ady menti oned in 
this work. Both men were invited by the Reparation Commission 
whioh, conjoinlJ with the Reioh government, first obtained ap-
82 Mildred S. Wertheimer, "Finanoial Crisis in Ger-
many," Foreign Poliol Reports, VIII, Maroh 2, 1932, 459. 
83 James T. Gerould, "Amerioa's Part in the Repara-
tions Problem,1I Current Historl, XXIX, Maroh, 1929, 1005-1007. 
The author scoffs at the unreality ot' such "unofficial" action. 
Says he: "It is hardly to be supposed that durin~! the exte:1ded I!i 
conferences that Owen D. Young and Mr. J.P. Morgan had with the '.1 
President, Seoretary Kellogg and Secretary Mellon the conversa- !I 
tion related exclusively to the weather. 1I The government's avi 
interest is also reflected in its mild chastisement of Young af 
ter he was unable to stop the European nations' shift of repara 
tions responsibility to the United states. Foreign Heluti~, 
1929, II, 1059-1062. 
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prova1 for this. draf·t from the State Department in Washington. 8 , 
The Young Commission, as the new gro~y of experts cam 
to be called, deliberated the problem of German reparations fro 
. . 
February 11, 1929 to the following June 7. The discussions, of 
course, were international in scope, but in the end the over-al 
deOisions oreated a relationship between the United states and 
Germany whioh had never existed before. This ocourred, in part 
beoause the German government, in its capaoity as a revived 
world power, believed that it oould now expect a whittling down 
of reparations payments,85 although in order to accomplish this 
desired reduction, it was plain that American creditors would 
be forced to cut their demands on the former Alli·es. The ex-
perts, therefore, were confronted with the task of finding a so 
lution to the .conflicting European and American attitudes towar 
the relationship of reparations to war debts. 
Ever sinoe the Armistioe, the United States had held 
to a policy of regarding German reparations payments and the Al 
\ 
lied war debt as two unrelated matters. As early as June, 1920 
Secretary of the Treasury Houston illustrated this viewpoint 
84 Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 1027. The State De-
partment, however, was not in favor of Young acting as ohair-
man of the Experts' Committee. Ibid., 1025. 
85 Stolper, 172. 
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, 
when he wrote to t~e, British Ambassador, Sir Aukland Geddes: 
It has be'en at all tiimes the view of the United 
S'tates Treasury that questions regarding the 
indebtedness of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Ireland to the United states Government 
and the funding of such indebtedness had no re-
lation either to questions arising concerning 
the war loans of the United States and of the 
United Kingdom to other governments or to ques-
tions regarding the reparations payments of the 
Central Powers of Europe.S6 
• Again, in the same year President Wilson addressed David Lloyd 
George, British, Prime Minister, in these words: 
The United States ••• fails to perceive the 
logic in a suggestion in effeot either that the 
United States shall pay part of Germany's re-
paration obligation or that it shall make a 
gratuity to the Allied Governments to induce them 
to fix suoh obligations at an amount within Ger-
many's capaoity to pay. This government has en-
deavored'heretofore in a most friendly spirit to 
make it olear that it oannot consent to connect 
the reparation question with lthat of intergovern-
mental indebtednesseS? 
This polioy was carried along by both political par-
ties in America during the entire era of the 1920·s. European 
ciroles, on the other hand, ba~ consistently held a different 
outlook, namely that a very real conneotion existed between Ger 
man-Allied and Allied-American post-war finances. This att1tud 
had been made quite clear in the famous Balfour Note of 1922, 
S6 Lewis Webster Jones, "American Attitude toward Re-
parations," The Congressional Digest, VIII, August-September, 
1929, 208-20g:-
87 Ibid.; Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 1059. 
" 
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,wherein German reduotions on reparations debts were promised in 
aooordanoe with any Amerioan olaims whioh were similarly·re-
.. 
, "'" duoed against Britain, a polioy later subsoribed to ~' the,Al-
lied debtors in general. 
The importanoe of oonsidering this point in a discus-
sion of German-Amerioan finanoial relations lies in the fact 
that through the Young Plan and its annexes, the former Eunope-
an Allies finally suooeeded in giving tangible expression to 
their views in this matter and practioally, if not legally, 
shifted the responsibility for a so.lution of the whole repara.-
tion problem to the United States. This was aooomplished by 
arranging a soheme between themselves and the Germans in which 
any of the latter's annuities going to the Reioh's oreditors 
would be reduoed by two-thirds of any reduotion granted by Amer 
ioa to the Allied debtors before 1965, and by the entire reduc-
tion from then until 1988, when suoh annual payments were to 
be completed. 
The Germans were at first loathe to aooept suoh a pro 
posal, for not only did they disapprove of oonneoting war debts 
to reparations,88 but they also believed that this plan would 
violate the time limit for reparations payments provided by the 
Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, after sufficient Allied 
pressure, they submitted, for as Dr. Schacht himself said: 
88 ~., 1928, II, 871. 
All representations on the part of the,Ger-
man experts that Germany had nothing in the 
world to do with the Allied debts broke down 
on the arbitrary politioal attitude of the 
other· S9 
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The Concurrent Memorandum, as the above agreement was 
named6 was an annex to the .Young Plan,90 signed by the former 
$ 
Allies and the Germans 6 but not by the Amerioan experts. By it 
the dootrine of the Balfour Note was Europeanized, and if the 
Germans ever wanted to reduoe their debt6 they were thenceforth 
obliged to first persuade the United States to reduoe its olaims 
on the rest of Europe. Moreover, in order to keep the question 
open as a German-American affair 6 the European oreditors so ar-
ranged it that that part of the reparations subjeot to postpone-
ment and immune from commeroialization beoame almost identical 
with that o·f Europe's debts with Amerioa. Thus, for the next 
thirty-seven years such noutp~yments"by Ge~any were intended t 
oorrespond to an amount equal to reparations 
after 1965 to parallel war debts only. This soheme, of oourse, 
maneuvered Amerioa into suoh a position as to make her the only 
recipient -- and therefore the only colleotor -- of the Reich's 
89 Howland, American Foreign Relations, 1930, 453. Quotes speeoh by Schaoht before the Deutsche Industrie und !!E:!l-
dlestag, Munioh, June 2S, 1929. 
90 Leon Fraser, "The Reparation Settlement Signed 
June 7, 1929, II International Conci11ation, No. 253, Ootooel', 
1929, 517-520. 
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reparat10n dues after 1965.91 
Another aspeot of the Young Plan wh;oh d1reotly in-
volved Amerioa and Germany found 1ts bas1s 1n a general fear 
. 
that, without a reduotion of United States olaims against the 
Weimar state similar to those offered by the ex-allies, the Ex-
perts' Commission would fail. The Amerioan government was con-
sequently faoed with the problem of either lessening the amount 
of its M1xed Claims Awards whioh were direot payments due indiv 
idual Amerioan oitizens, or outting its b1ll for Army of Ocoupa 
tion oosts 1n the Rhineland. 92 The latter oourse was deoided 
upon at a White House oonferenoe in mid-May, 1929, where both 
the President and ohief members of Congress agreed to a soaling 
down of army oosts by ten per oent of the original amount and t 
extend the term of payment. 93 The whole reduotion totaled only 
about thirty million dollars, but it served to insure the final 
success of the Young Conferenoe. This personal move on the par 
of President Hoover was charaoterized by the Nation as being a 
step away from the 
old, obstinate, intransigent posit10n of re-
fusing to do anything 1n the matter of repara-
II' 
II: 
I 
:1" 
91 E.L. Bogart, "Our Interest in the Reparations Pro'\- - ii:i 
lem," Atlantio Monthly, Boston and New York, The Atlantic Month 
ly Co., OXLV, April, 1930, 555-561. 
92 Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 1047. 
93 ~., 1075-1082. 
tions ••.• Had this oountry shown a willing-
ness to cut its demands (earlier], the repara-
tions issue would have been settled long ago •. 
• • • Amerioa has no more important duty than 
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to speed that se~tlement in every possible waY-94 
Finally, it might-be emphasized again that, like its 
view of the Dawes Plan, official American attitude toward the 
Young agreements was one of coolness, reserve, and at times, 
near-opposition. No authorized American representatives attend 
ed the conference sessions, nor did the United states subscribe 
to the principles upon which the new plan was based. For in-
stance, when the Bank for International Settlement was proposed 
in 1929, Secretary' of State Stimson refused to IIpermit any offi 
cials of the Federal Reserve System either to serve themselves 
or select American representatives" for the proposed financial 
concern. Said he: 
Wliile we look with interest and sympathy upon 
the efforts being made by the committee of ex-
perts to suggest a solution and settlement.of 
the vexing question of German reparation, this 
government does not desire to have any American 
official, directly or indireotly, participate 
in the collection of German reparations through 
the agenoy of a bank or otherwise.SS 
Similarly, in referenoe to the entire Young Plan, 
President Hoover announoed in June, 1929: 
94 "Amerioa Acta at Last," Nation, May 29, 1929, 
CXXVIII, 637. 
95 Jones, 208-209; Foreign Relations, 1929, II, 
1071. 
I , 
Our government is not a party to that agree-
ment and therefore would not be a signatory to 
it. There is no oooasion to submit the agree-
ment to Congress.96 . ~ 
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As a final note, then, it might be said that the 
Young Plan was acoepted and ratified by the European powers, in 
oluding Germany, in the early part of 1930. The United States, 
however, adamantly retained its offioial aloofness, although 
• later that same year it did swallow it,s pride enough to negoti-
ate for a private settlement of the German-American Mixed Claim 
question along the very lines set up by Young and his associ-
ates. 97 
Ultimately, of course~ the deoisions of both sides 
concerning the reparations issue came to nought, for the depres 
sion which had begun some months earlier in the Stock Exchange 
on Wall Street now struok Germany with all the ferocity of a 
. 
Caribbean hurr'ioane. It left in its wake a trail of cred! t 
withdrawals,98 unemployment, and mass discontent. Over three 
million Germans could not find work enough to earn their liveli 
hood, and the total was rising eaoh day. Rioters and demagogue 
captured the ears of the German people, so that by m1d-1930, 
they were willing to try anything in order to rise from the 
chaos. 99 
96 Jones, 208-209. 
97 Foreign Relations, 1930, III, 106-109. 
98 Ibid., 89. 
99 Ibid., 76. 
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In September of that year, then, appeared the first 
ominous indication that the end of the Weimar Republic was soon 
. . 
to be at hand, for in nation-wide eleotions for members of the 
. 
Reichstag, Adolf Hitler and his National Socialist party polled 
approximately six and one-half million iotes to rise from twe1v 
to a total of one hundred seven seats in that body. By this on 
gigantio sweep, the Nazis became the second largest party in 
the Reich, and immediately began pressing for extensive. posts 
in the machinery of the Weimar government.100 
Reports of-Hitler's triumph were immediately sent by 
the ChargedlAffaires in Germany, George A. Gordon, to the Sec-
retary of state. Gordon informed Stimson of the plight of the 
German people and charaoterized their action at the polls as 
giving "support to a party whose leader and promises are irre-
sponsible," and whose oampaign for votes was "extraordinarily 
confused, selt-oontradictory, and opportunist" in nature.10l 
Said he further of the Reioh populace: 
[lIt is doubly unfortunate that the more in-
telligent oitizens who were induoed to vote 
the National Socialist ticket could not • • • 
realize that in thus voting they were taking 
the surest steps to inorease the diffioulties 
of government, to further impair foreign con-
fidence -- espeoially in finanoial circles --
100 ~., 76. 
101 ~., 76-77. 
in the stability of German republioan institu-
tions, and in general, to intensify the eoono-
mio and finanoial evils of whioh they oomplain. 
However, they apparently thought neither of this 
nor of anything else of that nature. When over 
six million voters follow a party whioh promises 
"freedom and brea.d" without any indication as to 
how e·i ther is going to be provided, certainly 
the least that can be said is that such voters 
are in a very reckless frame of mind. lOa 
1413 
Reports concerning the Nazis themselves were far from 
• 
oomplimentary, for Gordon oited their use of Semitism, interna-
tional banks, the Young Plan, and the Treaty of Versailles as 
artioles of propaganda against the Weimar government. Above 
all, he oalled attention to their 'remedy" of "repudiation pure 
and simple of any suoh written obligations, and a march on Ber-
! lin, for the purpose of establishing.a reaotionary dictator-
I i ship ••• 0103 Ooncerning a representative of the Nazi party, a 
! 
., 
oertain Herr Schiokdanz, WhO visited him on the very day after 
the election, the oharge remarked: 
When trying to expound his party's program of 
"freedom and bread," Mr. Sohiokdanz could get 
no further than to repeat that the payment of 
tribute by Germany must oease and that as a 
oorrolary the theory of German war guilt, as 
embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, must be 
formally repudiated • • • • Just how this par-
ty proposes to aohieve this "freodom," however, 
and in what manner it envisages oonverti~ this 
achievement, if aocorllpliehed, into Buch a reme-
dy for the fundamental economic ills with which 
loa ~., 78. 
103 Ibid., 77-78. 
! " 
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Germany is beset, as to fulfill the prOm1se 
of "bread", he made no attempt to 1nd1oate.104 
.. 
All in all, then, Amerioa's offioial impress10ns of 
National Sooia11sm and its leader were, from the very start, 
suspioious and distrustful., Yet, they were not entirely with-
out hope, for as Gordon, with almost unoanny insight, put it: 
Danger is olearly there, and oannot lightly be 
overlooked or explained away ••• ; but yet a 
way remains open for all sinoere supporters of 
the Republio to make oommon oause against .this 
danger. If at suoh a junoture as this they fail 
to sink their personal and dootrinal differenoes, 
then indeed a serious situation will present it-
self_lOS 
104 Ibid., 82. 
105 .reg., 79. 
CHAPTER V 
CONOLUSION 
The investigation just presented has been the pro-
duct of extensive, though not exhaustive, research into a great 
• 
number of souroes having referenoe to America and Germany dur-
ing the period of the Weimar Republic. The facts reoordedare, 
of oourse, only the faots which have proved themselves avail-
able, and therefore it is quite possible that some errors of 
omission or interpretation have crept into the text. Relying, 
then, solely upon the information which has been gathered, and 
reoognizing the ohanoe of misjudgment, the following conclu-
sions seem to be warranted by the material at hand. 
In the first plaoe, it is quite olear that the Wei-
mar era provided for both Germans and Amerioans a genuine oppor 
tunity for a needed rapprochement after half a oentury of ~­
tagonism and open confliot. This ohanoe for renewed friend-
ship, it seems, was used to a muoh greater extent than is gen-
erally understood, for while the prooess was slow and progress 
intermittent, a distinotly different attitude could definitely 
be found existing between these peoples in 19~O from that which 
prevailed a decade earlier. 
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In support of the above observation, the view of the 
American publio toward the question of German war guilt in 1919 
.. 
oan be oontrasted with the feel1ng,wh1oh prevailed at the time 
of the Young Plan, and even-the government's outlook on food fer 
the Reich after the war oan be oompared to its later view on 
oooupational army oosts. The merohants and bankers, of oourse, 
did business for business' sake, but even among these the in-
orease of 1nteroourse from 1920 to 1930 shows a gradual growth 
in trust and oonfidenoe between the two former foes. Finally, 
it might be added that some elements of both nationalities for-
got their differenoes immediately after the armistioe, as did 
the nutritional experts and suoh humane organizations as the 
Friends and others. 
Surprisingly enough, the souroes of friotion whioh 
troubled the Reioh and Amerioa during the 1920's were oompara-
tively few in number. Probably the one most dreaded was that 
of possible German-Amerioan oommeroial competition, but though 
it was expeoted by large numbers, it never quite materialized. 
Similarly, tariff wars were oonspiouously absent, and despite 
the oomplaints of Amerioan oustoms injust1oe, no real oonfliot 
ever developed during the Weimar period. 
The aloofness and inaotivity of Washington, both 1n 
the reparations' struggle and in finanoial matters, must, of 
oourse, be admitted. Yet, even this was not directed only to-
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ward Germany, but r~ther was extended alike toward all things 
foreign under the traditional polioy of non-intervention and 
.. 
political isolation. The faots, however, show that this atti-
tude was quite often non-exis~ent exoept in name, for American 
individuals~high in power and experienced in world affairs took 
leading ~oles in almost all important foreign activities, thougb 
in an "unoffioial" capaoi ty. Again, where America IS advant.age 
was to be seoured -- as in the Berlin Paot -- there was no hes-
itanoy on the part of the United States government to negotiate 
, 
openly with the Germans, and its magnan1mouspo11cy toward the 
return of alien property is oertainly to be acoorded a high de-
gree of praise. 
All in all, then, this study of American relations 
with the. Weimar Republio presents not only an interesting oon-
trast to any similar review of interoourse with the Reioh eithel 
before or after the period between 1919 and 19~O, but also of-
fers some valuable guidanoe for ourrent Amerioan aotion. In a 
day when oitizens of this oountry are again faoed with the'task 
of re-orienting their views and polioies tow~ the German na-
tion and people, this report serves a very real purpose in show-
ing what can be aocomplished when peaoe, oo-operation, and har-
mony are substituted for distrust, olash of ideologies, and 
open warfare. And what has been done in the past can again be 
done in the future. 
.. 
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